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V.

I. INTRODUCTION
International human rights litigation often showcases the worst in
humanity—genocide, summary execution, torture, disappearance, and
war crimes, to name just a few of the atrocities alleged in these cases
over the past several years.1 In the United States, the principal vehicle
for litigating these human rights violations is the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),2
a famously enigmatic provision of the United States Code enacted by the
First Congress in 1789.3 ATS suits run the gamut, raising diverse issues
1. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15–17 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(describing allegations that security forces of Exxon Mobil Corporation engaged in “a
systematic campaign of extermination of the people [of the Aceh province of Indonesia],”
including acts of “genocide, extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual
violence, and kidnap[p]ing”), vacated, Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135, 2013
WL 3970103 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2013); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (involving allegations that a multinational energy conglomerate
aided and abetted the Nigerian government’s violent suppression of the residents of the
Ogoni region of Nigeria in response to protests against the energy company’s oil
production in the Niger Delta), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
550 F.3d 822, 825–26 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (recounting allegations that the government
of Papua New Guinea, in collusion with a British mining company, “engaged in aerial
bombardment of civilian targets, wanton killing and acts of cruelty, village burning, rape,
and pillage” that resulted in the deaths of an estimated fifteen thousand people on the South
Pacific island of Bougainville).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (providing in its entirety that “[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”).
3. As is often recounted, Judge Friendly once labeled the ATS “a kind of legal
Lohengrin . . . no one seems to know whence it came.” IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Indeed, despite the amount and depth of scholarship
produced over the past three decades regarding the origins of the statute, the original
purpose of the ATS is still subject to debate. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort
Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 619–37 (2002) (advancing the theory that
the First Congress “viewed at least the law of nations portion of the Alien Tort Statute as
an implementation of Article III alienage jurisdiction”), with William S. Dodge, The
Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 237 (1996) (interpreting historical evidence as
showing that the ATS was meant to provide a “broad civil remedy for violations of the
law of nations”).
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of international human rights law involving many of the world’s most
infamous humanitarian crises.4 Despite this thematic variety, ATS cases
frequently share a common feature: given the brutal events underlying
many of these suits, the actual victims of the human rights abuses alleged
are often deceased, missing, or otherwise incapable of litigating their
claims personally.5 As a result, human rights cases commenced pursuant
to the ATS are regularly prosecuted not by the alleged tort victims but
by the victims’ surviving relatives.6
Deceased-victim ATS cases are nothing new; in fact, the pathmarking
Second Circuit case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala involved plaintiffs who were
4. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
247–48 (2d Cir. 2009) (Second Sudanese Civil War); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Abu Ghraib prison scandal); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd.,
504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) (South African apartheid); In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (dictatorship of
Ferdinand Marcos); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Recently, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013), the Supreme Court dismissed an international human
rights complaint between Nigerian plaintiffs and Dutch and English corporations, reasoning
that “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States,” and thus a presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law applied to preclude the lawsuit. See id.
(holding that “mere corporate presence” in the United States does not suffice to “displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application” of federal law). Although the
Court’s opinion in Kiobel “leave[s] open a number of significant questions regarding the
reach and interpretation of” the ATS, see id. (Kennedy, J., concurring), its basic holding
requiring some connection between ATS suits and U.S. interests potentially limits the ability
of human rights claimants to redress global humanitarian crises through ATS litigation.
5. See, e.g., Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 605–06 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(describing the complaint as alleging that the plaintiffs’ relative was “tortured and killed”
in violation of U.S. law); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting that “[o]f the four victim Plaintiffs in this case, one died as a result of the injuries
suffered” as a result of the defendants’ allegedly illegal conduct); Sinaltrainal v. CocaCola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2009) (recounting that the defendants
“hired, contracted with, or otherwise directed paramilitary security forces that murdered,
tortured, or silenced leaders of the trade union representing workers at the Bebidas
bottling facility”).
6. See, e.g., Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50,
54–55 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he plaintiffs are several dozen American, Canadian,
and Israeli citizens, all of whom reside in Israel, who were injured, or whose family
members were killed or injured” by alleged international human rights violations); Aziz
v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that the appellants “are either
victims of mustard gas attacks or family members of deceased victims”); Mamani v.
Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1150–51 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[p]laintiffs are the
relatives of persons killed in Bolivia in 2003” as a result of alleged international law
violations).
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not the victims of the international law violations alleged.7 Yet
notwithstanding the prevalence of these cases, surprisingly little attention
has been paid to the basic question of whether nonvictim plaintiffs may
nonetheless bring suit and recover damages for the violations at issue.
Indeed, many of the most prominent cases in ATS law—including
Filartiga—took for granted the fact that the claimants before the court
were not the actual victims of the human rights abuses alleged.8 Similarly,
legal commentary has largely ignored this open question of ATS
jurisprudence, devoting more energy to defining the role of customary
international law in domestic courts.9
Absent authoritative guidance on this issue, courts confronted with the
deceased-victim scenario have generally framed the relevant inquiry as a
question of plaintiff “standing” under the ATS.10 The ATS, however,

7. 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (construing the plaintiffs’ complaint to raise
claims of torture in violation of the law of nations but indicating that the plaintiffs were
not themselves subject to the alleged illegal conduct). Prior to Filartiga, only a handful
of cases utilized the ATS as a basis for jurisdiction. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 n.15 (1985) (reporting that from the time of the ATS’s
enactment to Filartiga, “plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under the statute in only . . . 21
cases”).
8. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995) (failing to
consider whether the nonvictim plaintiffs could rightfully sue for damages on claims
based on harm to deceased parties); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776–77 (Edwards, J., concurring)
(same); id. at 799–802 (Bork, J., concurring) (same); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp.
860, 862–64 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
9. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the
Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 719–23 (2012) (recounting the
first significant period of ATS scholarship as centering around the status of customary
international law in domestic courts); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in
Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV.
153, 153–54 (describing “one of the sharpest and most bitter debates in recent international
legal scholarship” as regarding whether federal courts may “interpret and enforce customary
international law (CIL) as federal common law”).
10. See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1342–43
(11th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the nonvictim plaintiffs’ ability to bring suit as a question of
standing “both as a constitutional requirement and in terms of whether the [nonvictim
plaintiffs] possess a cause of action”); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ.
8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL
464946, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (construing the defendants’ objections to the
nonvictim plaintiffs’ ability to sue as an objection to their “statutory standing”); Bowoto
v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2006) (accepting the defendants’ characterization of their argument regarding the nonvictim
plaintiff’s authority to sue as a “lack [of] standing”); Estate of Cabello v. FernandezLarios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (same); Beanal v. FreeportMcMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 367–69 (E.D. La. 1997) (same); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162, 189, 192 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); see also BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 232–35 (2d ed. 2008)

386

[VOL. 50: 383, 2013]

Wrongful Death and Survival Actions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

has always been an awkward fit for the source of these substantive
requirements, given its obscure origins and concise phrasing.11 This
criticism became all the more trenchant after the Supreme Court’s
reorienting decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which clarified that the
ATS is a purely jurisdictional provision that simply opened the federal
courts to substantive causes of action based in federal common law.12
Still, even after Sosa, the prevailing standing formulation remained the
only game in town on the deceased-victim issue, leaving courts to
develop a patchwork of ATS standing rules drawn from state, federal,
and even foreign law sources.13 Not surprisingly, this ad hoc approach
has resulted in inconsistent and at times illogical results for human rights
plaintiffs in federal court.14
This Article aims to make sense of this neglected area of ATS law.
I contend that the salient issue in these deceased-victim cases is not
whether the nonvictim plaintiffs have standing to sue but rather whether
they have a viable cause of action in the first place. Standing and cause
of action concepts have an uneasy relationship in law.15 Although the
(addressing the question of who can sue for human rights violations to a deceased party
as raising an issue of “standing to sue for . . . wrongful death or disappearance”).
11. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 189 (noting that the ATS is “silent
concerning a plaintiff’s standing to bring suit based on injury to another”); see also
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 45 (“The ATS gives no guidance as to standing to sue
and the required relationship between the victim and the alleged violation.”).
12. 542 U.S. 692, 714, 724 (2004) (holding that the ATS is “jurisdictional in the
sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain
subject” but that the “jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest
number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time”);
see also infra notes 25–44 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *9 (applying New York state law to
determine whether relatives of deceased international human rights victims could
properly bring suit in an ATS action); Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761, at *11–12 (applying
Nigerian law to a similar question); see also infra notes 59–76 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106–28 and accompanying text.
15. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (expressing “a
marked desire to curtail” so-called “drive-by jurisdictional rulings, which too easily . . .
miss the critical differences between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional
limitations on causes of action” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“It is firmly established
in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to [an] arguable) cause of action does
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate the case.”); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979)
(explaining the lower court’s error in conflating the standing and cause of action
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distinction between constitutional standing and cause of action inquiries
is well established,16 the division is less clear where, as here, standing
doctrine is used to define a plaintiff’s eligibility to bring suit. Indeed,
reliance on standing terminology in this context often obscures and confuses
what should otherwise be a straightforward determination into the merits
of a litigant’s claim.17 Building on this insight, I argue that, at bottom,
the deceased-victim issue in ATS cases turns not on statutory standing
principles but on whether the plaintiff satisfies the substantive conditions
that trigger recovery. In this way, the alternative framework I propose
recasts the deceased-victim issue as essentially a merits inquiry into the
nonvictim plaintiff’s eligibility to recover damages. Given the kinds of
damages typically requested in these ATS cases, I conclude that wrongful
death and survivorship principles ultimately govern this analysis.
Part II of this Article begins with the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion
in Sosa, which offers the High Court’s most authoritative discussion to
date on the scope of the ATS and the litigation commenced pursuant to
its authority. Although Sosa does not address the deceased-victim issue
directly, the decision establishes several principles that guide the analysis of
this open question of ATS law. Next, Part III examines the prevailing
approach to the deceased-victim issue, which as described above, adopts
a formulation rooted in the terminology of standing doctrine. After
describing this approach in some detail, I argue that it is untenable in
both theory and practice, citing different instances in which courts have
wrestled with the current framework to rather unsatisfactory results.
Part IV then outlines the alternative framework previewed above. First, I
lay out the proposed approach in general terms, comparing deceasedvictim human rights claims to wrongful death and survival actions
available in traditional tort litigation. I then argue that courts should
analyses by describing that a plaintiff’s cause of action “depends not on the quality or
extent of her injury, but on whether the class of litigants of which [the plaintiff] is a
member may use the courts to enforce the right at issue”). But see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at
97 n.2 (“[T]he merits inquiry and the statutory standing inquiry often overlap . . . . [S]o
that it would be exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction between the two.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 239 n.18 (noting that “standing is a question of
whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case or
controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal-court jurisdiction,”
whereas “cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the
class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the
court”); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 92 (holding that the question of whether a plaintiff
has a cause of action under applicable law “goes to the merits and not to statutory standing”);
13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
AND R ELATED M ATTERS § 3531 (3d ed. 2008) (encouraging “greater care” in
distinguishing between “complex standing doctrine” and “questions of private right”).
17. See infra notes 79–90 and accompanying text.
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recognize a federal common law cause of action for death in violation of
international law, as well as a federal common law rule of survivorship
for international law tort claims litigated in federal court. I further
contend that state law should generally supply the rules of decision for
determining the proper plaintiff in ATS cases involving deceased victims.
This analysis relies on federal common law principles deployed in the
analogous jurisprudential settings of constitutional tort litigation and
maritime wrongful death law. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the
conceptual and practical advantages of the proposed approach as compared
with the prevailing framework.
II. THE SOSA FRAMEWORK
Sosa represents the Supreme Court’s first comprehensive appraisal of
the ATS since the statute’s enactment in 1789.18 Prior to Sosa, the
touchstone for most ATS jurisprudence was the Second Circuit’s seminal
decision in Filartiga, the progenitor of the modern line of international
human rights litigation in federal court.19 In that case, two Paraguayan
nationals brought suit against a former Paraguayan police official for the
alleged death by torture of their young relative at the hands of state
18. Prior to Sosa, only five published Supreme Court opinions referenced the
ATS, and in none did the Court address the origins and scope of the statute in any depth.
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004) (noting in dicta that jurisdiction under
§ 1350 is unaffected by the fact that a plaintiff is “being held in military custody”);
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436–37 (1989)
(rejecting the argument that Congress’s failure to enact a “pro tanto repealer” of the ATS
indicated a legislative intent to permit the continued exercise of federal jurisdiction over
foreign states beyond the limits imposed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act);
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 & n.17 (1972) (listing § 1350 among
the “many statutes that confer federal-question jurisdiction without an amount-incontroversy requirement”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 &
n.25 (1964) (stating that “[v]arious constitutional and statutory provisions,” including § 1350,
“indirectly support” the conclusion that the act of state doctrine should be “determined
according to federal law”); O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 48–53 (1908)
(dismissing a claim brought pursuant to the jurisdiction provided by the ATS on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to allege an actionable violation of international law
or treaty).
19. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 35 (2008) (observing that Filartiga “triggered a wave of academic scholarship
and more than a quarter-century of human rights litigation in U.S. courts”); see also
Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 461 (1989) (noting that Filartiga “breathed new life” into
the ATS’s “little-used and somewhat mysterious provisions”).
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police.20 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit reversed, ruling that the ATS
supplied jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.21 In sustaining federal
jurisdiction, the court also implicitly recognized the existence of a private
right of action in federal court for violations of the law of nations—
today’s “customary international law,” or simply, “international law.”
The court, however, failed to specify the source of this right beyond
stating that the ATS works to “open[] the federal courts for adjudication
of the rights already recognized by international law.”22
In the years following Filartiga, the majority of courts to address the
scope of the ATS agreed with the broad outlines of the Second Circuit’s
ruling, making Filartiga the “standard-bearer” for a new wave of ATS
litigation in American courts.23 Prominent dissenting voices, however,
fiercely resisted the emerging doctrinal uniformity, challenging both the
theoretical underpinnings of Filartiga and the purported benefits of ATS
litigation.24 Sosa represents the Supreme Court’s initial attempt to settle
this ongoing jurisprudential debate.

20. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs Joel
and Dolly Filartiga alleged that the defendant Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, then
Inspector General of Police in Asunción, Paraguay, “kidnapped and tortured to death”
Joelito Filartiga, Joel’s son and Dolly’s brother, “in retaliation for [Joel’s] political activities
and beliefs.” Id. The Filartigas brought suit under unspecified “wrongful death statutes,”
several international human rights agreements, “customary international law,” and federal
law. Id. at 879.
21. Id. at 878, 880.
22. Id. at 880, 887; see also Childress, supra note 9, at 718 (“[Filartiga] left open
whether the ATS could provide a private cause of action for a harm under international
law, or whether it merely opened the federal courthouse doors to such claims, subject to
standard choice-of-law principles that might be used to choose . . . the substantive law to
be applied.”).
23. See Philip Mariani, Comment, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the
Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1390
(2008); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 12–18 (describing how by “the fall of
2003, the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, along with
district courts in the First and D.C. Circuits, had all applied the ATS more or less as
outlined in Filartiga”).
24. Principal opposition to the Filartiga line of authority can be traced to Judge
Bork’s concurring opinion in the Tel-Oren case. There, Judge Bork rejected the view that the
ATS either creates an explicit cause of action for suits in violation of international law or
evinces a congressional understanding that such a cause exists as a matter of federal
common law. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811–16 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring). Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith expanded upon this
logic in their seminal 1997 article on the domestic status of customary international law
(CIL), arguing that CIL was not part of the federal common law post-Erie, and thus
federal courts cannot properly apply this law absent explicit congressional authorization.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 856–57
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A. Sosa and the ATS
For a decision heralded as a victory for human rights advocates,25 Sosa
involved decidedly inauspicious facts and a rather unsavory human
rights “victim.”26 Humberto Alvarez-Machain was a Mexican doctor
accused by the U.S. government of participating in the interrogation
and torture of Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar by Mexican drug traffickers in 1985.27 After his
indictment was dismissed in federal district court, Alvarez sued the U.S.
government and Jose Francisco Sosa, among others, claiming that the
Drug Enforcement Administration had hired Sosa to capture and transport
him into the United States to face criminal charges related to CamarenaSalazar’s murder.28 Alvarez asserted relief in part under the ATS, alleging
that Sosa’s participation in his kidnapping constituted a tort in violation
of international law.29 The lower courts agreed with Alvarez on his
ATS-related claim, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
Alvarez had failed to assert an actionable violation of international law.30
In so holding, the Court propounded three basic principles regarding the
scope of the ATS and the international law tort claims brought pursuant
to its authority.31
First, the Court held that the ATS is “strictly jurisdictional,” in that it
addresses “the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a
(1997). Bradley and Goldsmith’s “provocative claims” launched a wave of scholarship
principally focused on the scope of the ATS and its implications for the domestic status
of CIL. See Childress, supra note 9, at 719–22.
25. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 20 (“Human rights activists hailed the
long-awaited decision in Sosa as a major victory, a cause for celebration.”); Burley,
supra note 19, at 461 (“Scholars and human rights lawyers hailed Filartiga for lending
judicial weight to President Carter’s human rights policy and opening up a new field of
human rights litigation.”).
26. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 165 (stating that advocates of Filartiga-style
human rights litigation “could not have chosen a less propitious case for the Court to
review than Sosa”).
27. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) (describing allegations that
Alvarez “prolong[ed] the agent’s life in order to extend the interrogation and torture”).
28. Id. at 697–98.
29. Id. at 698. As the Court described, Alvarez invoked “a general prohibition of
‘arbitrary’ detention defined as officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to
detain under the domestic law of some government, regardless of the circumstances.” Id.
at 736.
30. Id. at 699, 736–38.
31. See infra notes 32–44 and accompanying text.
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certain subject.”32 So construed, the statute does not itself create any
substantive rights or private tort remedies for violations of international
law. 33 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the relevant history
surrounding the statute’s enactment also indicated that the grant of
jurisdiction was meant to serve as more than a mere “jurisdictional
convenience” for the benefit of some future legislature in later enacting a
substantive right of action.34 Rather, the ATS was intended to have
“practical effect the moment it became law.”35
This latter observation led the Court to its second central holding: the
cause of action cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 is a product of federal
common law.36 Surveying the relevant history, the Court explained that the
ATS was most likely intended to provide jurisdiction over a limited set
of actions recognized by the common law at the time of the statute’s
enactment.37 The Court further concluded that although “the prevailing
conception of the common law has changed since 1789” in a way that
reflects a more positivistic understanding of judicial authority, federal
courts today retain an element of “residual common law discretion”
allowing them to recognize additional common law causes of action derived
from present-day international law.38 Although the Court in recent years
has been reluctant to sanction similar judicial lawmaking in other
32. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14.
33. Id. at 713 (describing as “implausible” the contention that “the ATS was
intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of a new
cause of action for torts in violation of international law”).
34. Id. at 719.
35. Id. at 724. The Court based this historical conclusion on evidence that the
First Congress may have enacted the ATS to address concerns “over the inadequate
vindication of the law of nations” during the preconstitutional period. Id. at 717. Specifically,
the Court pointed to the Continental Congress’s 1781 resolution imploring the states to
provide civil remedies for violations of the law of nations, as well as two well-known
incidents preceding the Constitutional Convention involving assaults against foreign
ambassadors, both of which showcased the young national government’s inability to
provide federal remedies for law of nations violations. See id. at 716–17. But see
Bradley, supra note 3, at 637–46 (advancing the competing historical claim that the First
Congress intended the ATS to implement Article III’s alienage jurisdiction provision and
not to provide a forum for all suits alleging law of nations violations).
36. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.
37. Id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest
number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”).
38. See id. at 724–25, 738 (“[N]o development in the two centuries from the
enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the
law of nations as an element of common law . . . .” (citation omitted)). But see Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 24 at 852–56 (arguing forcefully that the “suggestion that
federal courts can apply CIL in the absence of any domestic authorization cannot survive
[Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)]” (footnote omitted)).
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contexts,39 the majority reasoned that in this case the “door is still ajar”
to “further independent judicial recognition of actionable international
norms” given both the federal courts’ vestigial “civil common law power”
post-Erie and Congress’s implicit sanction of this exercise of authority
since the enactment of the ATS.40
This lingering common law authority, however, is not unbound, and
the Court took pains to emphasize several “good reasons for a restrained
conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in
considering a new cause of action” under international law.41 This series
of considerations underlies the final doctrinal tenet of the Sosa decision:
any new common law cause of action cognizable under the ATS must
“rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to the features” of the narrow
set of international law violations actionable at the time of the statute’s
enactment in 1789.42 These historic paradigms comprise “three specific
offenses against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of
England: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.”43 In Justice Souter’s words, it was these three
offenses, “admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening
39. Most relevant here is the Court’s recent retrenchment on the availability of
federal common law remedies for constitutional violations under the Bivens line of
authority. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620, 622–23 (2012) (refusing to
imply a cause of action under federal common law for alleged violations of the
Eighth Amendment committed by prison staff at a federal facility operated by a private
company); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 548–50 (2007) (declining to create a federal
common law cause of action under the Fifth Amendment in favor of a landowner
alleging unconstitutional interference with property rights). See generally Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the
Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 822–24 (2010) (chronicling the
Supreme Court’s “refusal to extend Bivens liability to new constitutional claims or new
defendants since 1980”).
40. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 729–31; accord William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie:
Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 96–100 (2004) (arguing that Sosa endorsed a
“particularized approach that looks at the incorporation of customary international law
into the U.S. legal system issue-by-issue”). But see Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa,
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV.
869, 896 (2007) (“There is . . . tension, if not outright contradiction, in the Court’s
construction of the ATS as both purely jurisdictional and an authorization for creating
causes of action.”).
41. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 715 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68).
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serious consequences in international affairs, that [were] probably on the
minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference to tort.”44
B. The “Sosa Claim”
The Sosa decision was a jurisprudential innovation. Prior to Sosa,
prevailing jurisprudence was split on the source of the cause of action
cognizable under the ATS: the Second Circuit adopted the view that the
substantive right to sue derived from some unspecified, nonstatutory
source of law, and the Ninth Circuit advanced the theory that the ATS
itself supplied the private right of action.45 In rejecting both theories, the
Supreme Court clarified that the right to sue in any ATS litigation comes
from the federal judiciary’s “civil common law power” and thus is
principally a product of judicial lawmaking.46
For present purposes, the practical implications of the Court’s
determination are twofold. First, to borrow the words of William Casto,
Sosa “uncouple[d]” the federal cause of action for torts in violation of
international law from the ATS.47 As a result, it is no longer accurate to
say that ATS litigation involves “ATS claims” 48 or “ATS cause[s]
of action,”49 at least to the extent that these descriptions imply that the
substantive right to sue derives from § 1350. Sosa squarely held that the
federal claim cognizable under the statute is a product of federal
common law. Therefore, much like other judicially crafted causes
of action, this newly recognized claim should draw its title not from the
statute but the court decision to which it owes its existence.50 The claim
44. Id. at 696, 715.
45. Compare Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 243 & n.17 (2d Cir.
2003) (stating that Filartiga did not identify the ATS as the source of the private right of
action for violations of international law), with In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he [ATS] creates a cause of action
for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards . . . .”);
see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he [ATS]
establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to
give effect to violations of customary international law.”).
46. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.
47. See William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for
Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 664 (2006).
48. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 749 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated,
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.).
49. See, e.g., Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
50. Accord 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: ITS AGENCIES,
OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES § 3:1 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that the “judicially created causes
of action” for violations of constitutional rights are widely known as “Bivens actions”
after the Supreme Court case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which first recognized the nonstatutory private right to
sue for constitutional violations).
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identified in Sosa is thus properly named the “Sosa claim”: a product of
the Supreme Court’s Sosa decision and cognizable in federal court
pursuant to the ATS.
The second practical consequence of Sosa’s ruling pertains to the rules
of decision applicable to litigation under the newly identified common
law claim. As Casto explains,
The new cause of action envisioned by Sosa is unintelligible unless the wellestablished distinction between rights and remedies is kept clearly in mind.
The concept of a cause of action requires a plaintiff to establish that a
defendant has violated a legal norm designed to protect the plaintiff and that
the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy, which typically will be damages in ATS
litigation. Under this traditional dichotomy, the norm that is enforced in ATS
litigation comes from international law and therefore is to a significant degree
beyond the federal courts’ lawmaking powers. . . . Sosa’s pronouncement that
the federal courts have discretion to create or deny a cause of action relates to
the remedy rather than the norm.51

Pursuant to this theory, “[a]ll questions as to whether the defendant has
acted unlawfully must be answered by recourse to rules of decision
found in international law.”52 By contrast, all other aspects of the Sosa
claim are to be governed by domestic law.53 Casto clarifies that although
these two sources of law are nominally distinct, both form a part of the
federal common law.54 Thus, although “[t]here has been a tendency to view
ATS litigation as centered on international law,” the Court’s analysis in
Sosa “directs us to traditional, well-established concepts of domestic,

51. Casto, supra note 47, at 638–39.
52. Id. at 643.
53. See id. at 641. Casto explains that, in ATS litigation, “the most obvious divide
between international and pure United States domestic law is the separation of substance
from procedure” in that the federal courts will necessarily apply domestic procedural
rules in ATS cases. Id. at 642. Casto adds that domestic law will also govern “a number
of substantive issues that do not bear on the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct,” from
the very existence of a private damages remedy for the norm of international law violated to
the availability of an official immunity defense for alleged perpetrators. See id. at 643–
44; see also Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
H ASTINGS L.J. 61, 78–82 (2008) (arguing that post-Sosa, international law governs
“conduct-regulating norms,” whereas federal common law applies to “other rules of decision”
such as personal jurisdiction and procedure).
54. See Casto, supra note 47, at 641–42 (explaining that “international law is
incorporated into United States domestic law as a form of federal common law”).
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federal common law” in fashioning appropriate rules of decision in these
cases.55
III. SOSA CLAIMS BASED ON HARM TO DECEASED VICTIMS:
THE PREVAILING APPROACH
Sosa did not have cause to address the question of who is the proper
plaintiff in an ATS suit where the victim of the international law violation
alleged is deceased. The purported victim in Sosa was alive and well
and was the plaintiff in the lawsuit.56 As described above, however, ATS
cases frequently concern victims who are not so fortunate.57 In those
situations, the plaintiffs in the resulting lawsuits are normally the surviving
relatives or other next of kin of the decedents, raising the question of
55. Id. at 639. Casto’s hybrid theory is consistent with the language of Sosa. For
one, the opinion makes clear that the norms to be enforced in any ATS litigation are born
of international law. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (“Congress
intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging
violations of the law of nations.”). The decision also indicates that the remedy
for violations of those international norms—the private right to sue for damages in
federal court—derives from the judiciary’s “civil common law power” to create domestic
legal remedies. See id. at 725, 729–31 (observing that federal courts retain the authority
to “derive some substantive law in a common law way”). At the same time, the Court
elaborated that “the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations” and
that the exercise of judicial discretion sanctioned in ATS cases involves the creation of
“federal common law rules in interstitial areas of particular federal interest.” Id. at 726,
729. The Court’s language in this regard signals that although international law is
certainly relevant to the litigation of Sosa claims, principles of federal common law
ultimately determine the rules of decision applicable in any given case. See Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) (observing that the cause of
action in an ATS suit does not derive from “foreign or even international law” but rather
from “U.S. law”); see also Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The
Door Is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533,
558 (2004) (“Sosa does not require that every ancillary rule applied in an ATS case meet
the level of international consensus required for the definition of the underlying
violation. As in any case in which the federal courts exercise discretion to recognize
federal common law, the courts will fashion rules to fill gaps, borrowing from the most
analogous body of law.”); accord Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41–43 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (interpreting Sosa to hold that “customary international law provides rules for
determining whether international disapprobation attaches to certain types of conduct,”
while domestic federal common law determines “the nature of any remedy” for these
violations); cf. Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New
Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1932–33 (2010) (“[T]he relationship between
federal common law and international law is not binary but instead is best understood on
a continuum, with certain aspects of ATS litigation governed by federal common law
that is tightly linked to international law, other aspects governed by federal common law
that is not derived from international norms, and still others that fall somewhere in
between.”).
56. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698–99.
57. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
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whether these individuals may properly bring suit for injury befalling the
deceased party. Absent authoritative guidance on this question, lower
courts have coalesced around the approach pioneered by Xuncax v.
Gramajo from the District of Massachusetts.58 The remainder of Part III
reviews the analytical framework offered in Xuncax and concludes that it
is untenable in both theory and practice.
A. The Xuncax Approach
In Xuncax, nine Guatemalan nationals and an American citizen
brought suit against Hector Gramajo, the former head of the Guatemalan
Ministry of Defense, for violations of state, federal, and international
law.59 The plaintiffs sought damages for alleged human rights abuses
perpetrated against them and their relatives by the Guatemalan military
during the country’s long civil war.60 Gramajo, for his part, refused to
participate in the proceedings, and default was subsequently entered
58. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). Since Filartiga, only a handful of cases,
including Xuncax, have directly addressed whether an individual may raise an international
law tort claim based on injury to a third party. See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v.
Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2011); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618
(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009); Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006); Estate
of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 365–66 (E.D. La. 1997). Of the five cases
decided after Xuncax, all except Baloco relied explicitly on Xuncax’s methodology on
the deceased-victim issue. See Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *8–9; Bowoto, 2006 WL
2455761, at *11; Estate of Cabello, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1355–58; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at
366, 368. Moreover, a leading treatise on international human rights litigation in U.S.
courts also relies on the Xuncax methodology in explaining who may be the proper
plaintiff in ATS suits where the alleged tort victim is deceased. See STEPHENS ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 232–35.
59. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 169, 173.
60. See id. at 169–75. The complaint described “numerous acts of gruesome
violence inflicted by military personnel” under Gramajo’s “direct command.” Id. at 169.
With respect to the Guatemalan plaintiffs, the court described that “[s]ome of the plaintiffs
were themselves subjected to torture and arbitrary detention; others were forced to watch
as their family members were tortured to death or summarily executed; one plaintiff’s
father was caused to ‘disappear.’” Id. With respect to the American plaintiff, Dianna
Ortiz, an Ursuline nun who had been performing missionary work in Guatemala at the
relevant time, the district court recounted how she had been “kidnapped, tortured and
subjected to sexual abuse in Guatemala by personnel under Gramajo’s command. When
word of her treatment became public, Gramajo defamed her by falsely asserting her
injuries were inflicted by an angry lover.” Id. at 173.
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against him.61 Before entering judgment, however, the court explicitly
addressed the question raised by this Article: whether the plaintiffs were
eligible to bring suit for harms suffered by their deceased or otherwise
incapacitated relatives.62
In analyzing this open question of ATS law, the court made two principal
assumptions. First, the court construed the relevant inquiry as whether
the plaintiffs had “standing to bring suit based on injury to another.”63
By “standing,” the court apparently meant to refer to the concept of
statutory standing under the ATS, as opposed to constitutional standing
under Article III.64 Statutory standing generally refers to the issue of
“whether a statute creating a private right of action authorizes a particular
plaintiff to avail herself of that right of action.”65 Although Sosa later
clarified that the ATS does not provide a substantive right of action for
torts in violation of international law, Xuncax read the prevailing precedent
61. Id. at 169.
62. See id. at 169, 189–92. Three plaintiffs, Teresa Xuncax, Juan Doe, and Elisabet
Pedro-Pascual, alleged summary execution claims based on the unlawful killings of their
respective relatives. Id. at 169–70, 184. One plaintiff, Jose Alfredo Callejas, alleged a
disappearance claim based on the alleged abduction of his father. Id. at 171, 184. Teresa
Xuncax and Juan Doe also raised torture and arbitrary detention claims on behalf of
deceased relatives. Id. at 184. Plaintiff Juan Diego-Francisco asserted torture and arbitrary
detention claims for himself and on behalf of his wife. Id. at 169, 184. The decision did
not indicate whether Diego-Francisco’s wife was alive at the time of the lawsuit. See id.
at 170 (recounting that after being released from military custody, Diego-Francisco “left
for Mexico that same day with his wife”).
63. Id. at 189.
64. Constitutional standing under Article III requires plaintiffs to establish that
they suffered an “injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the defendants’ conduct and
that a favorable judicial determination is likely to redress the injury. See, e.g, Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). The court in Xuncax did not once mention these Article
III limitations in its discussion of the plaintiffs’ eligibility to bring suit based on injury to
their relatives. See 886 F. Supp. at 189–92.
65. See Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA.
L. REV. 89, 91 (2009). Supreme Court decisions have also suggested that statutory
standing implicates the prudential “zone of interests” test for party standing. See, e.g.,
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that an “element of statutory standing is compliance with . . . the ‘zone-of-interests’
test, which seeks to determine whether, apart from the directness of the injury, the
plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be benefitted by the provision at issue”).
However, the Court has never clearly articulated the relationship between these two
variants of standing law. See Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 127 n.12 (2d
Cir. 2003) (noting that the Supreme Court has previously labeled the zone of interests
test as a statutory standing inquiry but that courts have treated the inquiries as separate on
different occasions); cf. Robert H. Marquis, The Zone of Interests Component of the Federal
Standing Rules: Alive and Well After All?, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 261, 286 (1981)
(arguing for the elimination of “any theoretical distinction between the tests applicable in
determining the existence of an implied statutory right of action against governmental
and against private defendants”).

398

[VOL. 50: 383, 2013]

Wrongful Death and Survival Actions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

at the time as supporting the alternate conclusion that “§ 1350 yields
both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for tortious violations of
international law (or a treaty of the United States).”66
The second assumption underlying the court’s approach was that
federal law should supply the applicable rules of decision for claimant
standing under the ATS.67 Noting that the ATS is “silent” on the issue
of standing, the court cited the conventional practice of borrowing
substantive requirements from “analogous state statutes” to furnish
“important details” missing from a federal cause of action.68 The court
explained, however, that analogous federal provisions may be borrowed
where the “application of the state law would defeat the purpose of the
federal statute . . . or if there is a special federal need for uniformity.”69
With this rubric in mind, the court ultimately chose to apply the
liability provisions of the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), a
federal statute establishing causes of action for extrajudicial killing and
torture.70 According to the court, the TVPA permitted recovery for harms
suffered by third parties only by “a claimant in an action for wrongful
death.”71 Moreover, the court ruled that although forum state law generally
defines who qualifies as a wrongful death claimant, the TVPA also permits
the use of “foreign law recognizing a claim by a more distant relation in
a wrongful death action” where “application of Anglo-American law would
result in no remedy whatsoever for an extrajudicial killing.”72 Relying
on this interpretation of the statute, the court then applied a combination
of state and foreign law to determine each plaintiff’s standing to sue.73

66. 886 F. Supp. at 179–80; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 780 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (construing Filartiga to hold that
“aliens granted substantive rights under international law may assert them under § 1350”).
67. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191–92.
68. Id. at 189–90.
69. Id. at 190 (citation omitted).
70. See id. at 191 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil
Action § 2(a)(2))).
71. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action
§ 2(a)(2))). The court also noted that the TVPA permits recovery by the victim’s “legal
representative.” Id. However, the court did not rely on this language in analyzing the
viability of the plaintiffs’ third party claims. See id. at 191–92.
72. See id. at 191 (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 n.10 (1991)).
73. With respect to the plaintiffs’ summary execution and disappearance claims,
the court relied on the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act and the Guatemalan Civil
Code. Id. at 191–92. The Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act permitted a decedent’s
spouse or children to sue for damages, while the Guatemalan Civil Code also gave the
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The court’s decision to apply the TVPA in this regard turned in large
part on its view that state law is “ill-tailored for cases grounded on
violations of the law of nations”74 and that using state law by itself as the
applicable rule of decision would “mute[] the grave international law
aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety
municipal tort.”75
B. Evaluation of the Xuncax Approach
As described above, the Xuncax approach represents the prevailing
framework for determining whether a plaintiff may properly assert
international law tort claims based on injury to a deceased party.76
Unfortunately, although Xuncax’s analysis has some surface appeal, a closer
review reveals that it is both inconsistent with governing precedent and
unwieldy in practice.
1. Inconsistencies with Precedent
As an initial matter, Xuncax led with the wrong foot by characterizing
the relevant inquiry as a question of statutory standing under the ATS.77
Indeed, by asking whether a plaintiff has standing under § 1350, Xuncax
necessarily adopted an incorrect and now overruled interpretation of the
statute—that the ATS supplies a private right of action for violations of
international law. Sosa later made clear, however, that the ATS is purely
jurisdictional and does not create any new substantive rights;78 thus, it is at
best anachronistic to speak in terms of a plaintiff’s “standing” under the
decedent’s siblings that right of action. See id. at 191. As for the plaintiffs’ arbitrary
detention and torture claims, the court found that neither Massachusetts tort law nor the
relevant Guatemalan statutes permitted an individual to bring suit on behalf of a third party
victim. Id. at 192. Significantly, the court did not explain why Guatemalan law was the
appropriate “foreign law” to apply in this case. Presumably, the court turned to Guatemalan
law after performing some unspecified choice of law analysis. See, e.g., Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 863–65 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying, on remand, principles
from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 6(2) to determine the
availability of punitive damages in a case alleging violations of international law cognizable
under the ATS).
74. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 192.
75. See id. at 183 (emphasis omitted).
76. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 189 (framing the issue as whether the plaintiffs had
“standing to bring suit based on injury to another” under the ATS).
78. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004) (holding that the ATS
is “strictly jurisdictional [in] nature”); accord William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’
Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
CONN. L. REV. 467, 479–80 (1986) (characterizing as “simply frivolous” the suggestion
that the ATS creates a substantive cause of action for violations of the law of nations).
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ATS because the statute generates no right of action under which a plaintiff
may have standing to assert.
But even if translated into present-day jurisprudence, Xuncax’s standing
formulation still trespasses salient legal principles.79 Specifically, by
asking whether the plaintiff in a deceased-victim case has standing to
sue, Xuncax assumes that the plaintiff possesses a cognizable cause of
action in the first place.80 On this point, the decision in Dohaish v. Tooley is
instructive.81 In that case, the plaintiff brought suit for alleged due process
violations arising from a district attorney’s failure to prosecute an individual
allegedly responsible for the death of the plaintiff’s son.82 On appeal
from the district court’s dismissal, the appellate court noted that although
the lower court had dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for lack of “standing,”
the “major obstacle” to the plaintiff’s action was instead “the weakness
in the suit itself,” by which the court meant to refer to the plaintiff’s
failure to identify a viable cause of action.83 In this regard, the court
noted that to the extent the plaintiff sought to raise claims on behalf of
his deceased son, the dispositive question was whether these claims
survived his son’s death under the applicable survivorship law.84 Moreover,
to the extent the plaintiff sought damages for his own injuries flowing
from the death of his son, the court noted that he should investigate whether
governing law supplied him with a wrongful death cause of action.85
79. The few courts to address the deceased-victim issue post-Sosa have framed
the inquiry in terms of the plaintiff’s “standing” to bring suit under the common law
claim identified in Sosa. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006
WL 2455761, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (analyzing whether the “plaintiffs
lack standing to bring the decedents’ claims under the Alien Tort Statute”); cf. Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP),
02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009)
(characterizing the defendants’ “standing” argument as one of “statutory standing” under
the ATS).
80. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237 (1979) (explaining that the term cause of
action traditionally refers to “the alleged invasion of ‘recognized legal rights’ upon which a
litigant bases his claim for relief”).
81. 670 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982).
82. Id. at 935.
83. Id. at 936 (observing that “[b]oth the question of standing and the question of
legal sufficiency of the action focus on the nature of the plaintiff’s injury and the nature
of the invasion of his alleged right but different considerations underlie the two concepts”).
84. See id. at 937.
85. See id. at 938; cf. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545,
553 n.19 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying cause of action analysis, as opposed to standing
doctrine, to the issue of whether the plaintiff could bring suit under the federal securities
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Xuncax’s focus on plaintiff standing mirrors the lower court’s mistaken
analysis in Dohaish. Specifically, with respect to those international law
tort claims seeking damages personal to the decedent—claims for
arbitrary detention and torture—the Xuncax approach fails to consider
whether these claims survive the death of the actual victim.86 Yet basic
principles of tort law teach that a tort victim’s cause of action abates
upon the victim’s death absent explicit injunction to the contrary.87 With
respect to those claims seeking damages for a third party’s death itself—
claims for summary execution or disappearance—the Xuncax approach
similarly assumes that governing law supplies the plaintiffs with a
cause of action for death in violation of international law.88 Yet after
Sosa, federal courts cannot so lightly presume the existence of a cause of
action as a matter of federal common law.89 Thus, as in Dohaish, Xuncax’s
use of standing terminology obscures the actual issue at stake, that is,
whether the plaintiffs asserted a viable cause of action.90
In addition to this substantive obfuscation, the Xuncax approach is also
ill-advised for its reliance on federal law as supplying the applicable
rules of decision. Xuncax resolved what it saw as the open question of the
ATS’s standing requirements by fashioning a federal common law rule
drawn from the liability standards of the TVPA, a federal statute
laws because the scope of right to sue under a particular law does not implicate issues of
whether there is a “justiciable case or controversy”).
86. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that the
claims for arbitrary detention and torture were brought “on behalf of a husband, father,
and wife, respectively,” yet failing to discuss whether such claims survived the death of
the victims (emphasis added)).
87. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51, at 137 (2005); see
also Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212, 222–24 (1854) (holding that actions for trespass to
land and for tort “did not survive the death of the defendant, but abated upon the
occurrence of that event”).
88. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191 (announcing that certain plaintiffs have “a cause
of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350” for the death or disappearance of their relatives in
violation of international law).
89. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–28 (2004) (describing a
“series of reasons argu[ing] for judicial caution when considering the kinds of individual
claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the [ATS]”).
90. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 3531 (noting that by construing a
cause of action dispute as a standing issue, courts often obscure what should normally be
a simple private law question of enforceable interests behind the “special justiciability
concerns surrounding public-interest litigation”). Indeed, standing doctrine has largely
been a product of “litigation asserting the illegality of government action,” implicating
public concepts of judicial competence and separation of powers that are less relevant in
the context of a dispute between private persons and often serve only to confuse otherwise
straightforward private law questions. See id. See generally Lee A. Albert, Justiciability
and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139 (1977)
(discussing the relationship between justiciability and ideas on judicial review and restraint
and concluding that the relationships are incidental and remote).
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providing damages for extrajudicial killing and torture.91 In choosing to
adopt the TVPA’s requirements over analogous state law, the court justified
its position on the authority of Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Associates.92 In that case, the Supreme Court fashioned a timeliness rule
for civil RICO enforcement actions by adopting a federal limitations
period over the relevant state provision.93 The Court’s choice of federal
law over state law in this regard turned on two factors: (1) “the lack of
any satisfactory state law analogue to RICO”94 and (2) the possibility
that application of state law would “thwart the legislative purpose of
creating an effective remedy” for RICO violations.95 Neither factor,
however, was present in Xuncax.
With respect to the first factor—the availability of satisfactory state law
analogues—Xuncax itself recognized that Massachusetts law provided
readily apparent analogues to the plaintiffs’ claims.96 Actions under the
Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act approximated the plaintiffs’ claims
for summary execution and disappearance, and state law claims for personal
injury mirrored those for arbitrary detention and torture.97 Xuncax
discarded these state law parallels, however, on the grounds that “municipal
law is ill-tailored for cases grounded on violations of the law of
nations.”98 But as the Supreme Court has observed, domestic law for
centuries has recognized international law as part of the general common
law.99 Thus, municipal law is quite accustomed to adjudicating disputes
involving international law violations.100 More to the point, even if state
law is generally unfamiliar with violations of the scale and seriousness
of present-day human rights claims, municipal codes are certainly familiar

91. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191.
92. Id. at 190–92 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483
U.S. 143 (1987)).
93. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 149–50.
94. See id. at 152.
95. See id. at 154.
96. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191–92.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 192.
99. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“For two centuries we
have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”);
see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 202 (noting that “most scholars agree that CIL formed
part of the general common law” pre-Erie).
100. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 202–03 (recounting how early state court
decisions applied CIL independently of federal courts).
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with legal principles regarding recovery for death and personal injury,
precisely the decisional rules relevant to Xuncax’s inquiry.101
Regarding the second factor in Agency Holding, the adoption of state
law as the applicable rule of decision would not “thwart the legislative
purpose” behind the federal claim. As the Supreme Court described, the
First Congress envisioned the common law claim recognized in Sosa as
providing an essential remedy for certain widely accepted and clearly
defined violations of the law of nations.102 Applying state law to determine
who may litigate these claims would not impinge upon that remedial
objective in any meaningful way. In fact, the application of state law in
Xuncax would have permitted a remedy for the violations alleged—the
decedents’ spouses and children could have recovered for death damages,
and the decedents’ personal representatives could have recovered personal
injury damages on behalf of the deceased.103 Simply because state law
would have barred recovery for one class of plaintiffs—siblings—does
not mean the federal interest had been “thwarted.”104 Thus, contrary to
Agency Holding, Xuncax was wrong to rely on federal law for the
applicable rules of decision on the deceased-victim issue.105
101. See 1 STUART M. SPEISER & JAMES E. ROOKS, JR., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH §§ 1:15, 13:28 (4th ed. 2005) (describing state laws on wrongful death and
survival).
102. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714–24.
103. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 190–92.
104. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding that state law
did not undermine the effectiveness of a federal remedial scheme where it barred the
plaintiff’s claim but was not otherwise generally “inhospitable” to the federal remedy);
see also infra notes 243–54 and accompanying text.
105. Moreover, even if Xuncax was right to turn to federal law for the relevant
substantive standards, the court misread the TVPA as permitting courts to look to foreign
law in determining the proper plaintiff. As described above, the court held that under the
TVPA, courts could apply foreign law as the applicable rule of decision where
“application of Anglo-American law would result in no remedy whatsoever” for the ATS
claimant. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191. The court based this reading of the statute
on an “important footnote” in what it claimed to be the Senate Committee Report on the
TVPA. Id. at 191 (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 n.10 (1991)). This legislative history,
however, is in no way authoritative on the meaning of the statutory text.
For one, the Senate Committee Report on which the court based its interpretation
addressed statutory language that is different from what was actually enacted. The bill
that became the TVPA originated in the House of Representatives as House Report 2092
and was introduced on April 24, 1991. See 138 CONG. REC. 31,246 (1992); 137 CONG.
REC. 9071 (1991); see also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). The Senate
Committee Report cited by Xuncax commented on a parallel version of this legislation
introduced in the Senate as Senate Report 313 on January 31, 1991. See S. REP. NO.
102-249 (1991). Notably, the Senate version included different language on the proper
plaintiffs in an extrajudicial killing action: whereas the TVPA permits “any person who
may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death” to bring suit for extrajudicial killing,
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2. Difficulties in Practice
Xuncax’s conceptual failings also foretold the framework’s unwieldiness
in practice, as courts relying on Xuncax’s analysis struggled to make
sense of its prescribed methodology for determining the applicable rules
of decision. As described above, Xuncax held that the ATS shares the
TVPA’s “standing” requirements and that under the TVPA, courts may
turn to foreign law to determine a plaintiff’s standing to sue where
“application of [state] law results in no remedy whatsoever.”106
Unfortunately, this choice of law rule provided little principled guidance
to courts adjudicating deceased-victim cases.
In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., for example, the court cited
Xuncax in determining whether an Indonesian citizen could properly
raise disappearance and summary execution claims on behalf of certain
deceased victims of whom he was not a relative.107 However, when it
became clear that the application of state law would foreclose the plaintiff’s
claim, the court did not then turn to foreign law to answer the “standing”
issue as Xuncax had instructed.108 Although Beanal did not explicitly
address its deviation from Xuncax’s methodology, the court likely saw
no need to resort to foreign law because Xuncax’s holding was technically

the Senate bill permitted “a beneficiary in a wrongful death action” to bring suit.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action), with S. REP. NO.
102-249, at 7. It was to this latter language that the footnote in the Senate Committee
Report referred. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 n.10 (1991).
But even discounting the difference in statutory language, basing the TVPA’s interpretation
on such tenuous evidence of legislative intent runs counter to explicit precedent on the
utility of legislative history in statutory construction. See Shannon v. United States,
512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994) (holding that courts should not give “authoritative weight
to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way anchored in the text of the
statute”); accord Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“[C]ourts have no authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative history
that has no statutory reference point.” (quoting United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573,
1577 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted))); see also Wis.
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
“how unreliable Committee Reports are—not only as a genuine indicator of congressional
intent but as a safe predictor of judicial construction”).
106. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191.
107. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. 362, 366, 368 (E.D. La.
1997).
108. See id. (applying Louisiana wrongful death law to conclude that the plaintiff
“lacks . . . standing to sue on behalf of victims of disappearance or summary execution
under § 1350”).
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limited to persons related to the deceased,109 and the plaintiff in Beanal
“ha[d] not identified himself as a relative of any victim.”110
A few years later, in Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, the court
attempted to reconcile Beanal and Xuncax to rather unsatisfying results.111
Cabello hewed closely to Xuncax’s choice of law principle, applying a
combination of forum state law and foreign law to the question of
whether the individual plaintiffs could bring suit for the extrajudicial
killing of their relative.112 First, the court observed that forum state law,
Florida, would permit only one of the individual plaintiffs to bring suit
for the decedent’s extrajudicial killing.113 Following Xuncax, however,
the court determined that “analogous Chilean law” should apply because
“Florida law does not result in a remedy for the remaining Plaintiffs.”114
Under that foreign law, all of the remaining individual plaintiffs
could bring suit for the decedent’s extrajudicial killing.115 The court
acknowledged that Beanal, decided previously, “did not turn to analogous
foreign law” after finding that state law provided no relief to the plaintiffs
but nonetheless distinguished that case as addressing only “third party
standing, as opposed to whether an indirect or mediate victim of a wrongful
death may have standing to sue for extrajudicial killing under the

109. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191–92 (resolving the deceased-victim issue with
respect to plaintiffs who were all relatives or related to the alleged victims).
110. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 368.
111. See 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355–58 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Cabello arose out of the
1973 killing of Winston Cabello, a government appointee of then-Chilean President
Salvador Allende. Id. at 1349. The complaint alleged that after General Augusto
Pinochet’s successful coup of the Allende government, military officers in the new
regime, including the defendant Armando Fernandez-Larios, detained Cabello in
Copiapó, Chile and then illegally executed him along with twelve other political
prisoners. Id. The plaintiffs in the case brought suit for extrajudicial killing, torture,
crimes against humanity, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Id.
at 1350–51. All these claims were based on harm suffered by the decedent. Id.
112. See id. at 1355–58.
113. Id. at 1357. The court determined that the “applicable state law” was
Florida’s wrongful death statute, which provided that “wrongful death actions shall only
be brought by the decedent’s personal representative, when one exists under law.” Id.
(citing Benson v. Benson, 533 So. 2d 889, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)). Of the individual
plaintiffs, only the decedent’s sister, Zita Cabello-Barrueto, had been appointed personal
representative. Id. at 1350, 1357. Therefore, the court concluded that only she would
have “standing” to bring an extrajudicial killing claim should Florida law apply. Id. at
1357.
114. Id. (citing Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191). As in Xuncax, the Cabello court
presumably chose Chilean law as the events underlying the plaintiffs’ allegations occurred in
Chile, although the court offered no express discussion of this specific choice of law
decision. See id. at 1357–58.
115. Id. With respect to the specific foreign law applied, the court turned to Chile’s
wrongful death law under Articles 2314 and 2329 of the Chilean Civil Code. Id. at 1357.
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TVPA.”116 Given the Beanal court’s explicit references to the Xuncax
framework, however, Cabello’s reasoning on this point is far from
convincing.
More recently, a pair of opinions from different federal district courts
demonstrated the continuing uncertainty surrounding the application of
Xuncax’s choice of law rule. In the earlier case, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.,
several Nigerian plaintiffs brought international law tort claims on
behalf of relatives killed in a “series of brutal attacks” occurring in and
around Nigeria in the mid- to late-1990s.117 The defendants asserted that
these plaintiffs lacked “standing” under the ATS to sue on behalf of their
deceased relatives.118 Applying the choice of law rule outlined in Xuncax,
the court first looked to forum state law, California, but concluded that
California law would not allow persons in the plaintiffs’ positions to
bring suit on behalf of a deceased relative.119 Citing Xuncax and Cabello,
however, the court then applied Nigerian wrongful death law as the
applicable rule of decision.120 In so doing, the court did not attempt to
define the scope of this choice of law principle, although it did cite the
Beanal decision as authority against relying on foreign law sources
under certain circumstances.121
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., by contrast, the court offered
some limited guidance on when courts should resort to foreign law
sources over forum law.122 In that case, Nigerian plaintiffs alleged that
an international energy conglomerate, acting in concert with the Nigerian
government, perpetrated a “host of human rights violations” against the
plaintiffs in response to the plaintiffs’ protests against the energy company’s
oil production in the Niger Delta.123 The defendants moved to dismiss
on the familiar grounds that the plaintiffs lacked “standing” to sue for

116. Id. at 1357 n.5.
117. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *1–2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006).
118. Id. at *11.
119. Id. (noting that the plaintiffs disclaimed reliance on California law “[b]ecause
the decedents at issue all have surviving spouse(s) and children”).
120. Id. at *11–12.
121. See id. at *11.
122. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01
Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 25, 2009).
123. Id. at *1–2.
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the injuries suffered by deceased third parties.124 The court summarized
the prior authority on this issue beginning with Xuncax and concluded
that “[o]nly if the application of state law would defeat the purpose of an
asserted federal cause of action do courts look instead to the most
analogous federal statute,” the TVPA, which prior decisions had also
concluded permitted the use of foreign law.125 The court determined,
however, that it need not look beyond state law in this instance because
the plaintiffs were capable of receiving “letters of administration” under
state law that would allow them to bring suit based on the harm alleged
to deceased victims.126
Wiwa’s struggle to reconcile the varying precedents utilizing Xuncax’s
choice of law framework highlights a fundamental weakness in Xuncax’s
approach, namely, the lack of any real principle guiding a court’s choice
of the applicable rule of decision. Xuncax held that in determining what
persons are eligible to assert international law tort claims based on harm
to deceased parties, courts should look to state law unless doing so
provides “no remedy whatsoever” to the plaintiff, at which point courts
may then apply “foreign law recognizing a claim by a more distant relation
in a wrongful death action.”127 But does this rule apply only to plaintiffs
who are related to the deceased, as Beanal suggests? Also, what situations
qualify as providing “no remedy whatsoever”? As in Wiwa, is it accurate to
say that state law provides a remedy where the plaintiffs can acquire
representative status through the forum’s probate laws? Moreover, even
assuming all conditions are satisfied to resort to “foreign law,” on what
foreign law should the court rely? Cabello and Bowoto answered this
question with little analysis, but there will undoubtedly be situations
where the answer is not so evident.128
All told, the Xuncax framework fails to set out a principled rubric for
determining whether a given ATS plaintiff may bring suit based on
international law violations befalling a deceased party. For absence of
any alternatives, however, courts confronted with this issue began their
124. Id. at *8. The court noted that the parties had referred “interchangeably” to
the defendants’ arguments as a lack of “standing” and “capacity.” Id. at *8 n.30. The court,
however, construed the issue as one of “statutory standing,” which implicated “prudential
considerations” on federal jurisdiction under Second Circuit law. See id. at *8 & n.31.
125. Id. at *8 (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 190–92 (D. Mass.
1995)).
126. Id. at *9.
127. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191.
128. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 36 (“Determining what body of law
governs particular issues in ATS cases is one of the most unsettled post-Sosa issues
facing the lower courts.”); see also id. at 233 (stating that “[t]he case law under the ATS
is not always clear about what law applies” to questions of who may bring suit based on
harm suffered by deceased victims).
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analysis with the Xuncax decision. By virtue of its longevity then, more
than its accuracy, Xuncax has become the prevailing approach for assessing
a plaintiff’s ability to raise Sosa claims based on harm to a deceased
victim.
IV. SOSA CLAIMS BASED ON HARM TO DECEASED VICTIMS:
A NEW APPROACH
The prevailing approach to the deceased-victim issue in ATS cases is
untenable in both theory and practice. However, the basic principles
underlying this flawed methodology suggest a new way forward. Xuncax
erred at the outset by framing the relevant inquiry in terms of the
plaintiff’s standing to sue under the ATS. Although the court’s reliance
on standing terminology is analytically imprecise, the court’s initial
instinct to question the plaintiff’s eligibility to bring suit was sound. At
bottom, the salient issue in these cases is whether an individual who is
not the victim of the international law violation alleged may nonetheless
recover damages for the illegal conduct at issue. Although it is tempting
to couch this issue in the language of standing law, the inquiry more
accurately turns on a straightforward analysis of whether the plaintiff has
stated a viable cause of action for relief.
The following Part outlines an alternative approach to the deceasedvictim issue based on this fundamental insight. First, I explain that the
search for the proper plaintiff in these ATS cases is essentially a cause of
action inquiry regarding the availability of wrongful death and survival
damages. I then argue that courts should recognize a federal common
law cause of action for death in violation of international law, as well as
a federal common law rule of survivorship for international law tort
claims in federal court. This Part concludes with a discussion of the
doctrinal and practical advantages of this proposed approach over the
prevailing Xuncax framework.
A. Wrongful Death and Survival Claims Under Sosa
Wrongful death actions seek recovery for injuries suffered by one
person resulting from the death of another.129 By contrast, survival claims
129. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 294, at 804 (2000) (“Wrongful death
statutes create a new action in favor of certain beneficiaries who suffer from another’s
death as a result of a tort.”).
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request relief on behalf of a deceased individual’s estate for injuries
suffered by the decedent prior to death.130 In wrongful death cases, whether
a given plaintiff can bring suit is a function of the applicable wrongful
death law, which generally creates a cause of action for the decedent’s
death and also defines the class of persons that may recover wrongful
death damages.131 In survival cases, a plaintiff’s right to recovery similarly
turns on the applicable survivorship law, which typically prescribes the
categories of claims that survive the decedent’s death and also the persons
who may sue on behalf of the victim’s estate in any resulting survival
action.132
Sosa claims based on harm to deceased victims present situations
analogous to both of these types of traditional tort actions. Specifically,
these claims generally seek either (1) damages for harm to the plaintiff,
resulting from the death of the plaintiff’s close relative or next of kin,133
or (2) damages for injuries suffered directly by the deceased relative prior to
death.134 Claims in the first category approximate wrongful death actions,
while those in the second category are analogous to survival actions.135

130. See id. (“Survival statutes do not provide for an independent action in favor of
the deceased’s dependents. . . . They provide for the survival of whatever action the
deceased herself would have had if she had been able to sue at the moment of
her death . . . .”). See generally 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:13 (describing
the conceptual differences between survival and wrongful death actions).
131. See JACOB A. STEIN, 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 3:48
(3d ed. 1997); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 127 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing statutory wrongful death
causes of action).
132. See 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:15 (describing different survival
statutes).
133. See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the murders of their fathers caused them damages
including emotional harm, loss of companionship and financial support.”).
134. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (observing that several plaintiffs “have brought this
lawsuit on behalf of third parties killed in the attacks and their heirs”); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 369 n.2 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing Sosa
claims made “on behalf of others” who had been killed as a result of the illegal conduct
alleged).
135. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2010)
(accepting the district court’s characterization of plaintiffs’ Sosa claims alleging death or
nonfatal injury to third parties as “ATS wrongful death and survival claims”); In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994)
(applying survivorship principles developed in the context of federal civil rights jurisprudence
to an abatement argument advanced in the ATS context); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ.
7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (noting that
plaintiffs’ claims “can be divided into two categories: (1) claims for damages resulting from
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Thus, as in those more traditional tort actions, the answer to the proper
plaintiff issue in deceased-victim ATS cases depends on the type of Sosa
claim asserted.136
With respect to those cases seeking wrongful death-style damages, the
inquiry is twofold: the reviewing court must first determine whether
there is a cause of action under governing law for an individual’s death
in violation of international law, then, if so, whether the plaintiff falls
within the class of persons eligible to assert that cause of action.137 For
ATS suits seeking survival damages, the analysis is similarly sequential.
Courts must make the preliminary determination of whether the
decedent’s claim survives the decedent’s death, then, if so, whether the
plaintiff can properly bring suit on behalf of the decedent’s estate in the
resulting survival action.138 Under Sosa, all of these questions would be
governed by federal common law.139 The remainder of this Part addresses
each point in turn.
the death of a relative . . . and (2) claims for damages based on non-fatal injuries suffered
by a deceased relative”).
136. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18 (1979) (holding that the cause
of action analysis turns on the “nature of the right” asserted); see also 13A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 16, § 3531.6 (explaining that courts engaged in the cause of action
analysis must first determine “whether [the] particular category of wrong is ever open to
correction by injunction, declaratory judgment, or damages,” then, if so, “whether [the]
particular plaintiff satisfies the conditions on which one or another of these remedies is
available”).
137. Cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 403–09 (5th Cir. 1961) (performing a
similar two-step analysis in the context of determining whether the plaintiff may seek
wrongful death damages for death caused by an alleged violation of federal civil rights
laws).
138. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590–94 (1978) (holding that a
federal civil rights claim survives in accordance with forum state law, which prescribes
both the types of claims that survive the death of the victim and the persons eligible to
then raise those claims on behalf of the decedent’s estate).
139. As discussed above, under Sosa, international law determines all questions
regarding the standards and scope of the defendant’s liability, while domestic law
supplies the rules of decision for all other aspects of the litigation. See Casto, supra note
47, at 641; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013)
(noting that the claims underlying an ATS suit do not arise from “foreign or even
international law” but rather from “U.S. law”). The availability of wrongful death and
survival actions in Sosa cases pertains solely to the scope of the remedy for violations of
international law alleged, not the extent of the defendant’s liability under the relevant
norm of conduct. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970)
(“[T]he decision whether to allow recovery for violations causing death is entirely a
remedial matter.”); 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:13 (noting that survivorship
laws are “remedial in nature”). Thus, domestic law will supply the primary rules of
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1. Wrongful Death Claims Under Sosa
a. Relevant Precedent
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether federal common
law recognizes a cause of action for an individual’s death in violation of
international law. Several lines of precedent, however, inform this inquiry.
First and foremost is Sosa itself. In that case, the Court focused its
attention on the distinct question of what types of international law norms
may support a claim of relief in domestic courts.140 Sosa’s reasoning
thus pertains primarily to the kinds of legal norms that may be enforced
through the common law, not the “technical accoutrements” of the
underlying litigation such as the availability of wrongful death recovery.141
Nonetheless, given Sosa’s extensive discussion regarding the limits on
the exercise of judicial discretion in the ATS context, the Court’s analysis
in that case necessarily guides the present inquiry into the availability of
a wrongful death cause of action.142
On that score, the principles articulated in Sosa prescribe that courts
may devise common law causes of action for violations of international
law where these judicial remedies comport with the discernible intent of
Congress. Sosa held that any claim based on the present-day law of
nations must rest on a norm of international character that is as widely
accepted and clearly defined as the trio of eighteenth-century offenses
against the law of nations recognized in Blackstone’s Commentaries.143
In delineating this standard, the Court relied upon a “series of reasons
argu[ing] for judicial caution” in crafting common law remedies for

decision on these issues. See Casto, supra note 47, at 644 (observing that the availability
of a wrongful death cause of action under Sosa and the survival of a Sosa claim should
be governed by federal common law principles).
140. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724, 725 (2004) (requiring that
“any claim based on the present-day law of nations . . . rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms” of piracy, infringements on the rights of
ambassadors, and safe conducts).
141. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,
269–70 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (interpreting Sosa as approving of the
proposition that the “law of nations generally does not create private causes of action to
remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defining the remedies that are
available for international law violations” (quoting Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 246
(2d Cir. 1995))).
142. See Casto, supra note 47, at 635–36 (stating that Sosa “established an analytical
watershed” for ATS litigation and that therefore “all analyses of ATS litigation must
flow from Sosa’s guidelines”).
143. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715, 732.
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international rights violations.144 These reasons included (1) the “general
understanding” that the federal courts’ exercise of common law power
includes “a substantial element of discretionary judgment”; (2) “the general
practice” of looking for “legislative guidance before exercising innovative
authority over substantive law”; (3) the recognition that “a decision to
create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in
the great majority of cases”; (4) “the potential implications for the foreign
relations of the United States” when courts recognize common law remedies
for violations concerned with the “power of foreign governments over
their own citizens”; and (5) the apparent lack of any “congressional mandate
to seek out and define new and debateable violations of the law of
nations.”145
Underlying these cautionary factors is a palpable concern that judicial
lawmaking in the field of foreign affairs may run afoul of the expressed
intent of the political branches of government, particularly that of
Congress.146 Thus, in limiting the class of new international law torts to
those similar to Blackstone’s trio of offenses, the Court found dispositive
the intent of the First Congress in enacting the ATS in the first place.
Reviewing the relevant history, the Court concluded that the First
Congress “intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations,” including
offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conducts, and piracy.147
Given the cautionary factors described above, the Court then determined
that these three “historical antecedents” should serve as exemplars for
any new claim drawn from international law.148 Consistent with the
Court’s reasoning, any exercise of common law authority to recognize a
cause of action for wrongful death under Sosa must at the very least
come to terms with the available evidence of legislative intent on that
issue.149
144. See id. at 725.
145. See id. at 725–28.
146. See David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic
Status of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 496–97 (2010) (arguing that Sosa
manifests “a separation of powers vision that leaves primary responsibility for lawmaking and
foreign affairs to the political branches rather than the courts”).
147. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719–20.
148. See id. at 732.
149. Cf. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 43–46 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(examining the “historical context” of the ATS’s passage to determine whether corporations
may be held liable for torts in violation of international law under Sosa).
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Sosa’s deference to congressional attitudes points to another line of
precedent relevant to the present inquiry. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized a
private right of action under federal common law for violations of the
Fourth Amendment.150 This landmark ruling birthed a body of case law
principally concerned with policing the boundaries of the federal courts’
authority to craft common law remedies for violations of constitutional
rights.151 In that regard, before courts may create a cause of action for
constitutional violations under Bivens, they must first ask whether Congress
or a state legislature has enacted “any alternative, existing process for
protecting the interest” at stake, and then, even in the absence of such
statutory alternatives, whether there are any “special factors counselling
hesitation” in the exercise of the courts’ common law discretion.152
This latter inquiry focuses on the institutional competence of the courts,
relative to the legislature, to devise remedies implicating sensitive
government policy.153
These principles of judicial deference to congressionally designed
remedies should find even greater currency in the jurisprudence of Sosa.
Like Bivens actions, litigation under Sosa involves judicially crafted,
common law remedies for violations of rights guaranteed under a discrete
body of law: international law, in the case of Sosa, and the Constitution,
in the case of Bivens.154 Moreover, as with Sosa claims, the nature and
scope of the Bivens remedy is primarily a project of the federal courts,
with congressional intent acting as a backstop to judicial discretion.155

150. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971) (“[D]amages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a
violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials . . . .”); see also Henry P. Monaghan,
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 23–24 (1975) (characterizing Bivens actions as exemplary of the “the long recognized
federal common law process of articulating the remedial implications of federal statutory
rights”).
151. See James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 125–30 (2009).
152. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
153. See 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, supra note 50, § 3:5.
154. Compare Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (holding that
federal courts may recognize “private claims under federal common law” for violations
of certain clearly defined and widely accepted norms of international law), with Wilkie,
551 U.S. at 549–50 (observing that the Bivens line of precedents authorizes “nonstatutory
damages remedies” for “constitutional violation[s]”).
155. Compare Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28 (“[T]he general practice has been to look
for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”),
with Bush, 462 U.S. at 389 (refusing to create a Bivens remedy for a NASA employee
alleging First Amendment violations because “Congress is in a far better position than a
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The Supreme Court itself relied on Bivens case law in articulating the
cautionary factors that federal courts must consider when determining the
scope of the common law remedy for torts in violation of international
law.156 Given the similarities between the common law remedies in
Bivens and Sosa, respectively, the principles of judicial deference articulated
in the Bivens context should also guide the instant determination of
whether to allow wrongful death recovery under Sosa.157
Further direction on this issue can be gleaned from the Supreme
Court’s seminal discussion of American wrongful death law in Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc.158 In that case, the Court established a
nonstatutory cause of action under the general maritime law for deaths
caused by a violation of maritime duties.159 In so doing, the Court overruled
its nearly century-old precedent The Harrisburg, which previously
determined that the general maritime law did not furnish a cause of
action for wrongful death.160 Although Moragne’s precise holding thus
addressed a specific question of maritime law, the Court’s opinion in
that case advanced two broader propositions relevant to the availability
of recovery for death in violation of international law.161

court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on
the efficiency of the civil service”).
156. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68
(2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)) (“[A] decision to create a
private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of
cases.”).
157. See Casto, supra note 47, at 639–40, 645 (relying on Bivens principles to
propose an analytical framework for litigation under Sosa because “ATS litigation in
Sosa’s wake is so obviously analogous to Bivens litigation”); see also Harold Hongju
Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court
Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 13 (2004) (describing the
cause of action under Sosa as “kind of an international law version of the Bivens remedy,
a federal common law, civil remedy for a very limited class of gross human rights
violations” (footnote omitted)).
158. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See generally 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:8
(describing Moragne as “probably the most important wrongful death case holding in the
history of American jurisprudence—perhaps, in all Anglo-American jurisprudence”).
159. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
160. See id. (overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886)).
161. Accord 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:8 (noting that although Moragne
is nominally a maritime case, “its significance and relevance as a precedent are not at all
limited to the field of maritime law”).
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First, in overruling The Harrisburg, Moragne concluded that American
common law generally recognizes a cause of action for wrongful death.162
To reach that conclusion, the Court began by acknowledging the general
consensus among domestic courts at the time that “in American common
law, as in English, ‘no civil action lies for an injury which results in . . .
death.’”163 Upon reviewing the history of this common law rule, however,
the Court determined that “it was based on a particular set of factors that
had . . . long since been thrown into discard even in England, and that
had never existed in this country at all.”164 As further proof of the common
law rule’s disrepute, the Court recounted that as early as the mid-nineteenth
century, “legislatures both here and in England began to evidence
unanimous disapproval of the rule,” resulting in the “wholesale
abandonment” of the rule through state and federal legislation affirmatively
providing for wrongful death recovery.165 Given these “numerous and
broadly applicable statutes,” the Court ultimately concluded that “the
allowance of recovery for wrongful death [has become] the general rule
of American law, and its denial the exception.”166

162. See 398 U.S. at 393 (“[T]he allowance of recovery for wrongful death [is] the
general rule of American law, and its denial the exception.”).
163. See id. at 380 (quoting Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756 (1878)). The Court
traced the origins of the common law prohibition against wrongful death recovery to “a
feature of the early English law that did not survive into this century—the felony-merger
doctrine.” Id. at 382. As the Court described, although this doctrine “found practical
justification” in the idiosyncrasies of seventeenth-century English jurisprudence, “[t]he
historical justification marshaled for the rule in England never existed in this country.”
Id. at 382–84. For an authoritative review of the history of the common law rule
prohibiting recovery for wrongful death, see T. A. Smedley, Wrongful Death—Bases of
the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
164. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 381. Indeed, the Court observed that the rule represented a
“striking departure” from “elementary principles in the law of remedies. Where existing
law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause injury,
nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation should be nonactionable
simply because it was serious enough to cause death.” Id.
165. See id. at 388–90.
166. See id. at 390, 393. Justice Harlan’s methodology in updating the common
law to reflect contemporary legislative policies has generated significant scholarly attention.
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 151–58 (1982)
(indicating that Justice Harlan viewed the common law rule that failed to permit
wrongful death damages as outdated); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 612–14
(4th ed. 2007) (observing that the Court in Moragne used statutory evolution as a basis
for overruling a dated decision); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179,
201–03 (1986) (criticizing Justice Harlan’s reasoning); Note, The Legitimacy of Civil
Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan’s Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258,
263 (1972) (“The first observation to be made about the [Moragne] Court’s reasoning is
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The second relevant principle articulated in Moragne pertains to the
Court’s methodology in recognizing a wrongful death cause of action
under the general maritime law. As with Bivens claims, the Court held
that the creation of a nonstatutory remedy for wrongful death is not
appropriate where congressional enactments evince a “legislative direction
to except” the particular right to recovery requested.167 To that end, the
Court in Moragne characterized its ultimate inquiry as deciding “whether
Congress has given such a direction in its legislation granting remedies
for wrongful deaths in portions of the maritime domain.”168 From there,
the Court evaluated the principal legislative enactments in the field of
maritime law, the Death of the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and the Jones
Act, to conclude that “Congress has given no affirmative indication of an
intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death”
based on a breach of maritime duties.169 Specifically, the Court concluded
that “no intention appears that [DOHSA] have the effect of foreclosing
any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found appropriate to
effectuate the policies of general maritime law.”170 This conclusion was
also “wholly consistent with the congressional purpose” evident in the
Jones Act of ensuring the “uniform vindication of federal policies.”171
Together, Sosa, the Bivens line of authority, and Moragne establish
several principles that guide the determination of whether to recognize a
common law cause of action for death in violation of international law.
First, under Moragne, the provision of wrongful death recovery is now
“the general rule of American law, and its denial the exception.”172 Sosa
warns, however, that federal courts must exercise “judicial caution” in
using the common law to devise remedies for violations of international
rights.173 In particular, any judicially crafted remedies must substantially

that it flies directly in the face of a good deal of received learning about common law judicial
views of legislation.”).
167. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393; accord Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19
(1980) (explaining that a Bivens remedy is not appropriate where “Congress has provided an
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective”).
168. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393.
169. Id. at 393–403.
170. Id. at 400.
171. Id. at 400–01.
172. See id. at 393; see also Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972)
(holding that Massachusetts common law recognizes a cause of action for wrongful death).
173. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
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align with the discernible intent of Congress,174 a criterion similarly
reflected in the Bivens line of authority.175 Therefore, under these
precedents, federal courts may recognize a cause of action for death in
violation of international law only where (1) Congress has expressed no
intent to prohibit this recovery by, for example, enacting an “alternative,
existing process” protecting the interest at stake, and (2) even in the
absence of such discernible congressional intent, there are no “special
factors counselling hesitation”176 or other “reasons argu[ing] for judicial
caution”177 with respect to the creation of a common law remedy. The next
subpart applies these principles to the present inquiry.
b. Availability of Wrongful Death Recovery Under Sosa
Federal courts should recognize a common law cause of action for
death in violation of international law because Congress has expressed
no intent to bar this relief and there are no “special factors counselling
hesitation”178 with respect to the creation of this judicial remedy. First,
Congress has not enacted any “alternative, existing process”179 addressing
the interests at stake or otherwise indicating a legislative intent to preclude
the common law wrongful death remedy at issue here. The most relevant
federal statute on the issue of wrongful death recovery for international
law violations is the TVPA, which “‘establish[es] an unambiguous and
modern basis for’ federal claims of torture and extrajudicial killing,” two
widely accepted and clearly defined violations of international law.180 In
the case of an “extrajudicial killing,” the statute extends a cause of action to
“any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death” of
the victim.181 This congressionally designed process does not, however,
174. See id. at 727.
175. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
176. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
177. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
178. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.
179. See id.
180. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991));
see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 140, 148 (stating that “every court to consider
the issue has agreed” that torture is a “widely accepted, clearly defined violation[] of
international law” and that “[a]n extrajudicial killing or summary execution is a violation
of the most basic internationally protected right, the right to life” (footnotes omitted)).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)); see
also Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the TVPA permits recovery of wrongful death damages in addition to damages
resulting from injury to the deceased). As defined by the statute, an “extrajudicial killing” is
“a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Definitions § 3(a)).
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preclude a nonstatutory remedy for deaths in violation of international
law.182
In Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument
regarding the preclusive effect of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in
the context of a Bivens action for violations of the Eighth Amendment.183
In that case, the administratrix of the estate of a deceased federal
prisoner brought suit against federal prison officials alleging that the
decedent suffered fatal injuries caused by the officials’ failure to provide

182. Congress has also enacted three additional statutory causes of action that may
potentially be used to recover for death in violation of international law. The first is 28
U.S.C. § 1605A, which “provides that designated state sponsors of terrorism may be
subject to a federal cause of action for money damages if those terrorist states cause or
otherwise provide material support for an act of terrorism that results in the death or
injury of a United States citizen or national.” In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism
Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 59 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006)). Second,
there is 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note, commonly referred to as the “Flatow Amendment,” which
“provides a private right of action [only] against [individual] officials, employees, and
agents of a foreign state, [but] not against the foreign state itself,” where the foreign state
is a designated state sponsor of terrorism. See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Third is the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006), which “create[s] a remedy in admiralty
for wrongful deaths more than three miles from shore.” See Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 620 (1978).
The two former statutory causes of action are primarily designed to “protect American
victims of state-sponsored terrorism,” and in particular, to hold foreign states liable in
damages for acts of international terrorism. See In re Islamic Republic, 659 F. Supp. 2d
at 41–49 (recounting the passage of these two statutes and the consequent litigation
brought under their authority); see also Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d
53, 71 n.16 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the Flatow Amendment “came into disuse” after
the D.C. Circuit ruled that it did not provide a cause of action against foreign states).
DOHSA, as the title suggests, addresses only deaths occurring on the high seas, and
although the statute could be read to cover certain conduct causing death in violation of
international law, see, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2010), the Supreme Court has stated that DOHSA “does not address every issue of
wrongful-death law,” Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, and further suggested that
common law claims for international torts occurring on the high seas are not preempted
by DOHSA. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (noting that claims arising out of acts of piracy
are cognizable under federal common law).
Thus, unlike the TVPA, these three statutes do not represent explicit congressional
action on the specific topic of wrongful death caused by international law violations. Cf.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (stating
that the TVPA is “expressly addressed” to providing a remedy for the practices of “[o]fficial
torture and summary executions”).
183. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–23 (1980).
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him with “competent medical attention.”184 In rejecting the officials’
argument that the FTCA precluded the creation of a separate Bivens
remedy, the Court reasoned that the statute’s legislative history indicated
that “Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes
of action.”185 These “congressional comments” included statements that
the FTCA should be seen as a “counterpart” to Bivens and that victims
of intentional conduct “will have a cause of action against the individual
Federal agents [through Bivens] and the Federal Government [through
the FTCA].”186 Based on these and other statements from legislative
history, the Court declared that the FTCA “contemplates that victims of
the kind of intentional wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have
an action under [the] FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens
action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their
constitutional rights.”187
A similar congressional intent exists here with respect to the relationship
between the TVPA and the common law remedy recognized by Sosa.
The TVPA’s legislative history is rife with statements indicating a desire
to supplement rather than replace the federal remedy for international
law violations once found in the ATS and now recognized at common
law. 188 For example, the relevant congressional committee report
acknowledges that “[s]ection 1350 has other important uses and should
not be replaced.” 189 Moreover, the report speaks of the TVPA as
“enhanc[ing] the remedy already available under section 1350.”190 Most
significantly, the legislative record explicitly acknowledges that the
claims subject to the TVPA “do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately be covered b[y] section 1350. That statute should remain
intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in
the future into rules of customary international law.”191 Although this
statement refers specifically to the norms underlying the common law
remedy, the overall sentiment of the TVPA’s legislative history supports
the conclusion that, as with the FTCA in Carlson, the statute was not

184. Id. at 16 n.1.
185. Id. at 19–20.
186. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2789, 2791).
187. Id. at 20.
188. In describing the relationship between the TVPA and the ATS, the House
Committee Report reflected the prevailing jurisprudence of the time by noting that the
federal cause of action for torts in violation of international law “has been successfully
maintained under . . . section 1350.” H.R. REP. NO.102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id.
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meant to preclude common law remedies for violations of international
law.192
Next, with respect to the existence of any “special factors counselling
hesitation,” concerns over the judiciary’s institutional competence should
not bar the creation of a freestanding common law remedy for death in
violation of international law.193 In Bush v. Lucas, the Supreme Court
concluded that “special factors counselling hesitation” preclude the creation
of a Bivens claim where Congress is in a better position to determine the
most effective way to remedy a violation of legal rights.194 In that case,
a federal employee claimed First Amendment violations based on his
alleged retaliatory demotion from a post at NASA.195 In declining to
create a Bivens claim, the Court observed that the employee already had
available to him an “elaborate remedial system that has been constructed
step by step [through several decades of federal legislation], with careful
attention to conflicting policy considerations.”196 Thus, the Court reasoned,
the issue in the case was not “what remedy the court should provide for a
wrong that would otherwise go unredressed” but rather, whether the
court should “augment[]” the “existing regulatory structure” by creating
a “judicial remedy” for the violations alleged.197 Given the legislature’s
“considerable familiarity with balancing governmental efficiency
and the rights of employees” in the context of the federal civil service,
the Court concluded that “Congress is in a better position to decide
whether or not the public interest would be served” by the “addition of
another remedy for violations of employees’ First Amendment rights.”198

192. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980). The decision in Enahoro v. Abubakar,
408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2005), is not to the contrary. In that case, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the TVPA preempts any common law claims for torture and extrajudicial
killing cognizable under the ATS. See id. But see Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). Given the TVPA’s legislative
history recounted above, however, even if the statute provides the exclusive remedy for
extrajudicial killing, the TVPA should not be read as expressing a congressional intent to
bar other common law causes of action for conduct causing death in violation of
international law.
193. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983).
194. See id. at 378, 388–89.
195. Id. at 369–72.
196. Id. at 388.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 388–90; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428–29 (1988)
(declining to create a Bivens remedy for alleged due process violations arising out of the
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More recently, in Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court relied on similar reasoning
to deny a Bivens remedy to a private landowner alleging that the Bureau
of Land Management violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.199
That case concerned allegations that the bureau had engaged in years of
“harassment and intimidation” aimed at securing for the government an
easement over the landowner’s property.200 In denying the plaintiff a Bivens
remedy for his allegations, the Court lamented the “difficulty of devising
a workable cause of action” encompassing the landowner’s complaints.201
Indeed, in the Court’s view, “[a] judicial standard to identify illegitimate
pressure going beyond legitimately hard bargaining would be endlessly
knotty to work out, and a general provision for tortlike liability . . . would
invite an onslaught of Bivens actions.”202 In such a case, the Court
concluded, Congress is better suited to “tailor [a] remedy to the problem
perceived.”203
The concerns expressed in Bush and Wilkie do not apply here. Unlike
Bush, Congress has not enacted an “elaborate remedial system” designed
to redress violations of international law causing death.204 Thus, in
determining whether to create a common law remedy for these violations,
courts need not engage in the kind of detailed policy analysis better left
to the institutional competence of the legislature.205 Indeed, to the extent
that Congress has implemented a remedial framework addressing violations
of international law, the legislature has acknowledged and affirmed the
judiciary’s role in developing the federal government’s response to these
denial of Social Security benefits because “Congress is the body charged with making
the inevitable compromises required in the design of [the] massive and complex welfare
benefits program” embodied by the federal Social Security system).
199. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 547–48, 561–62 (2007).
200. Id. at 542–47.
201. Id. at 562.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983). As discussed above, only four
federal statutes address violations of international law causing death: the TVPA, 28
U.S.C. § 1605A, the Flatow Amendment, and DOHSA. See supra note 182. This
statutory scheme does not come close to matching the comprehensive regulatory structure at
issue in Bush. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 385 (describing the regulatory protections afforded
federal civil service employees as an “elaborate, comprehensive scheme” built by decades of
legislation, “Executive Orders, and the promulgation of detailed regulations by the Civil
Service Commission” (citation omitted)); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,
424 (1988) (describing the Social Security system as affecting “virtually every American”
and “‘of a size and extent difficult to comprehend’” (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 399 (1971))).
205. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 388 (stating that the decision to “augment[]” the civil
service system necessitates “a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and
the respective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of another remedy
for violations of employees’ First Amendment rights”).
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violations through common law legislation.206 In that regard, unlike Wilkie,
courts are perfectly capable of crafting wrongful death causes of action
that balance the competing interests of victims and tortfeasors, and to the
extent they need guidance, wrongful death legislation at both the state
and federal level provides a plethora of examples to steer judicial
discretion.207
The question remains, however, whether “special factors” unique to
the ATS setting counsel against the creation of a common law remedy
for death in violation of international law. Of particular relevance here
is the Supreme Court’s directive in Sosa that courts should be “wary of
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
managing foreign affairs” for fear that judicially crafted remedies
addressing international law violations “would raise risks of adverse foreign
policy consequences.”208
Several doctrinal safeguards, however, assuage these concerns. First,
under Sosa, any wrongful death remedy would be available only against
conduct that violates a norm of international law already meeting the
high bar of general acceptance and clear definition outlined by the
Supreme Court.209 This rigorous standard acts to limit undue judicial

206. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3–4 (1991) (citing with approval Filartiga’s
recognition of a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing and stating that courts
“should . . . permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (“Congress has not in any relevant way amended § 1350 or
limited civil common law power by another statute.”).
207. The Moragne decision is particularly on point here. In that case, the Supreme
Court rejected arguments that the federal courts would be at a loss in determining the
content of a nonstatutory cause of action for wrongful death. See Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970). Such “fears,” the Court concluded, “are
exaggerated” because “[i]n most respects the law applied in personal-injury cases will
answer all questions that arise” and “numerous state wrongful-death acts have been
implemented with success for decades.” See id. at 405–06, 408. As Justice Harlan aptly
stated, “The experience thus built up counsels that a suit for wrongful death raises no
problems unlike those that have long been grist for the judicial mill.” Id. at 408.
208. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“[T]he danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the
conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS, because the question is
not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”).
209. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (“[F]ederal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”).
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interference into foreign policy as “courts can then focus on the application
of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive
task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest
or with international justice.”210 Second, even where the application of
clearly established international principles would raise foreign policy
concerns, courts may assess the political implications of creating a wrongful
death remedy using well-worn principles of political question doctrine211
or as the Court itself acknowledged, a “policy of case-specific deference to
the political branches.”212 In all events, although there may be situations
where a wrongful death remedy is inappropriate, that determination can
be made on a case-by-case basis and need not preclude the recognition of
this common law cause of action as a general matter.
Accordingly, for these reasons, courts should recognize a cause of
action under federal common law for the death of an individual caused
by a violation of international law.
2. Identity of the Wrongful Death Claimant
Having determined that applicable law militates in favor of a wrongful
death remedy in the ATS context, I now turn to the details of that cause
of action, specifically, the class of persons eligible to bring suit. The
Supreme Court has made clear that in crafting federal common law rules,
courts must adhere to the general “presumption” that forum state law
supplies the rules of decision in the vast majority of cases.213 Courts
may develop “uniform federal rules” to fill the interstices of federal law
only when the federal scheme at issue “evidences a distinct need for
nationwide legal standards” or “when express provisions in analogous
statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily applicable
to the matter at hand.”214 In all other circumstances, forum state law
should provide the rules of decision, “unless application of [the particular]
state law [in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal

210. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
211. See, e.g., Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(dismissing ATS claim on political question grounds).
212. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
213. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991); see also Nw.
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (holding that federal
courts must be cautious in fashioning common law rules because “the federal lawmaking
power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government”); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (noting that the situations justifying the creation of a
federal common law rule are “few and restricted”).
214. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98.
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programs.”215 These factors counsel the adoption of forum state law as
the rules of decision for determining the class of plaintiffs eligible to
bring suit for a death in violation of international law.
a. Necessity of Nationwide Legal Standards
First, there is no “distinct need for nationwide legal standards” regarding
the proper plaintiff in these cases. In the seminal case Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court relied on this concern for
national uniformity to fashion uniform federal rules regarding the rights
and duties of the United States with respect to its commercial paper.216
In that case, the U.S. Treasury sought reimbursement for a payment it
had issued pursuant to a forged check collected by Clearfield Trust
Company as agent for J.C. Penney Company.217 The Court first
determined that federal law governs “[t]he duties imposed upon the
United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance” of
its commercial paper.218 Then, with respect to the content of that federal
law, the Court rejected the lower court’s call to apply the laws of the
forum state, observing that “[t]he issuance of commercial paper by the
United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from
issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states.”219 To leave
these transactions “to the vagaries of the laws of the several states,” the
Court held, would “subject the rights and duties of the United States to
exceptional uncertainty.”220
This concern for avoiding uncertainty is less important, however,
where the rights and duties at issue are tangential to the core question of
liability. In O’Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,
the FDIC, as receiver to a troubled corporation, sued the law firm
O’Melveny & Myers for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with the firm’s work for the corporation on several
real estate transactions.221 O’Melveny argued that the FDIC was estopped
from pursuing its claims because certain of the corporation’s executives
215. See id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728
(1979)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
216. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943).
217. Id. at 364–66.
218. Id. at 366.
219. Id. at 367.
220. Id.
221. See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 81–82 (1994).
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had engaged in malfeasance with respect to these transactions and
California law imputed the executives’ knowledge of wrongdoing to the
FDIC as receiver.222 The FDIC argued in response that the Court should
fashion a uniform federal rule against the imputation of the executives’
knowledge to the FDIC.223 The Court rejected the FDIC’s request,
concluding that the FDIC’s stated interest in promoting national uniformity
on the imputation question was insufficient to justify the creation of a
uniform federal rule.224 In so holding, the Court reasoned that the
imputation rules at issue “affect only the FDIC’s rights and liabilities, as
receiver, with respect to primary conduct on the part of private actors
that has already occurred.”225 Thus, although the adoption of federal rules
in such cases may ease the litigation burden on the FDIC by “eliminating
state-by-state research and reducing uncertainty,” so “generic” an interest in
avoiding the “ordinary consequences” of nationwide litigation could not
support the exercise of judicial discretion requested.226
Under this case law, there is no “distinct need” for national standards
on the question of who is the proper plaintiff in wrongful death actions
under Sosa. Unlike the rules at issue in Clearfield, these proper plaintiff
rules do not implicate the “rights and duties” of the parties regarding the
core question of liability.227 Rather, as in O’Melveny, these rules concern
only the tangential question of who may bring suit based on “primary
conduct . . . that has already occurred.”228 Thus, as was the case with the
FDIC, although the creation of a uniform federal rule on this issue may
ease the litigation burden on Sosa plaintiffs, this interest in avoiding the
“ordinary consequences” of litigation is too “generic” to displace the
usual presumption in favor of state law.229 This is particularly true given
the fact that the plaintiffs in ATS actions, like all plaintiffs, can choose
222. Id. at 82–83.
223. Id. at 85.
224. Id. at 87–88.
225. Id. at 88.
226. Id.
227. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see
also 2 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 13:34 (“A personal representative proceeding
under wrongful death statutes requiring him to bring the action for the benefit of certain
designated beneficiaries is a mere nominal party having no interest in the case for
himself or the estate he represents.”).
228. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87–88; see also Glenn v. Johnson, 764 N.E.2d 47, 52
(Ill. 2002) (“The personal representative is merely a nominal party to this action,
effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of
kin, who are the true parties in interest.”).
229. See O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 88; cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 347
n.13 (1966) (observing that the “desirability of a uniform federal rule” does not justify
“failure to comply with reasonable requirements of local law” (quoting Bumb v. United
States, 276 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1960))).
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the forum for litigation and thus have the ability to predetermine which
state’s wrongful death rules will govern their claims.230
b. Congressional Policy Choices
Second, there are no “express provisions in analogous statutory schemes
embody[ing] congressional policy choices” on the proper plaintiff issue.231
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Supreme
Court held that provisions in a federal statute may serve as the basis for a
federal common law rule where the provisions evince a congressional
judgment regarding a point of law bearing a “close similarity” to the
matter at hand.232 In that case, the Court concluded that section 10(b) of
the National Labor Relations Act would supply the limitations period for
an employee’s claims for wrongful termination and unfair representation.233
In rejecting analogous limitations periods from state law, the Court held
that section 10(b) is “actually designed to accommodate a balance of
interests very similar to that at stake” in the case at bar.234 The Court
determined that in enacting section 10(b), “Congress established a
limitations period attuned to what it viewed as the proper balance between
the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of
private settlements, and an employee’s interest in setting aside what he
views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system.”235
Thus, the Court concluded, section 10(b) represented a “more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking” than forum state law.236
With respect to the proper plaintiff issue, there are no express provisions
of analogous federal statutes evidencing a congressional judgment on the
proper plaintiff in cases alleging death in violation of international law.
The federal statutory scheme most analogous to a wrongful death action

230. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that venue
statutes “are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of
courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy”);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 397–98 (discussing choice of forum for human rights
plaintiffs in U.S. courts).
231. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991).
232. DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170–71 (1983).
233. See id. at 154–55.
234. See id. at 165, 169.
235. Id. at 171 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70–71
(1981)) (Stewart, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 172.
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under Sosa is the TVPA.237 As the Supreme Court described, this statute
represents Congress’s attempt to codify certain aspects of the common
law remedy for torts in violation of international law first recognized in
Filartiga.238 In that regard, the TVPA creates a statutory cause of action
for the extrajudicial killing of an individual, actionable by that individual’s
“legal representative” or “any person who may be a claimant in an action
for wrongful death.”239 Notably, however, the TVPA is silent on the
precise definitions of these two categories of claimants.240 Instead, the
legislative intent discernible from the statute indicates that state law supplies
the rules of decision on this issue.241 Thus, to the extent Congress has
237. See supra note 180–82 and accompanying text.
238. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 731 (2004).
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)).
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
241. Normally, undefined terms in a federal statute of national application are defined
by reference to federal standards. See, e.g., Info-Hold Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538
F.3d 448, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2008); Spina v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 470 F.3d 116, 126
(2d Cir. 2006). However, where Congress indicates an intent to define such terms by
reference to state law, courts must defer to the legislature’s expectations. See Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 209–10 (1946). In Reconstruction Finance,
the Supreme Court found just this sort of legislative intent with respect to the term real
property in the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act (RFCA). Id. at 206,
210. The RFCA provided that any “real property” of certain federal agencies would be
subject to the same state and local taxes as “other real property” in the state in which
such federal property was located. Id. at 206. In holding that the term real property
should be defined in accordance with applicable state law, the Court reasoned that
Congress intended this result by subjecting this type of property to municipal taxation in
the first place. Id. at 209 (“Congress, in permitting local taxation of the real property,
made it impossible to apply the law with uniform tax consequences in each state and
locality.”). “Concepts of real property are deeply rooted in state traditions, customs,
habits, and laws,” the Court observed, and “[l]ocal tax administration is geared to those
concepts.” Id. at 210. By subjecting federal “real property” to municipal taxation, the
Court determined, the RFCA necessarily indicated a congressional intent to define
that term in accordance with the states’ “long-standing practice of assessments and
collections.” Id.
A similar congressional intent to incorporate state law is evident in the TVPA’s
“extrajudicial killing” provision. As described above, that provision permits both the
victim’s “legal representative” and a designated wrongful death “claimant” to bring suit
for damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action
§ 2(a)(2)). In so doing, the statute creates a damages remedy for both the harm suffered
by the victim and the harm caused by the victim’s death; in other words, the statute
creates both a survival claim and a wrongful death claim based on an extrajudicial
killing. See Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347–48 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding that the TVPA permits “appropriate wrongful death claimants to be
able to sue alongside representatives of the deceased”). State law has long been the
primary source of law on questions of survivorship and wrongful death, and many state
statutes expressly define both who may be a victim’s “personal representative” in a
survival action and who the proper “claimants” may be in a wrongful death action. See
generally 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:9. Thus, as in Reconstruction
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expressed any “policy choices” with respect to the proper claimant in
cases alleging international law violations causing death, the legislature’s
judgment is that forum state law should supply the rules of decision.242
c. Frustration of Important Federal Interests
The final consideration—whether the application of a particular state
law would frustrate important federal interests—is context specific and
depends on the facts of each case.243 However, to the extent that reliance
on forum state law in a wrongful death action under Sosa would result in
only some of the victim’s surviving relatives being eligible to bring
suit, 244 state law should still supply the rules of decision.

Finance, by creating causes of action so rooted in state law concepts, the TVPA
necessarily indicates a legislative intent to integrate applicable state law definitions into
its remedial scheme. Cf. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155–56 (1944)
(defining the term public utility in the federal Price Control Act in terms of state law
because “[t]he great body of law in this country which controls acquisition, transmission,
and transfer of property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to
private parties, is found in the statutes and decisions of the state”).
This intent is further confirmed by the House Committee Report on the legislation that
became the TVPA, which expressly states that “[c]ourts may look to state law for
guidance as to which parties would be proper wrongful death claimants” under the
statute. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991).
242. Congressional guidance on the proper plaintiff issue can also arguably be
gleaned from the DOHSA, which designates a decedent’s “personal representative” as
the proper plaintiff in an action involving death on the high seas. See 46 U.S.C. § 30302
(2006). As described, however, DOHSA is inapposite to Sosa claims alleging deaths in
violation of international law generally. See supra note 182. Moreover, even if DOHSA
were to supply the rule of decision on the proper plaintiff issue, the statute itself still
does not define precisely who is the decedent’s “proper representative,” again indicating
that forum state law governs this issue. See supra note 241; see also Complaint of
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., S.A., 453 F. Supp. 265, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that
the term “‘personal representative’” in DOHSA “‘refer[s] to one who receives authority
of some sort from a state’” (quoting Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 841, 842
(2d Cir. 1946))).
243. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4518 (2d ed. 1996) (describing different contexts
in which courts have concluded that the application of state law would disrupt a stated
federal purpose).
244. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 191 (D. Mass. 1995) (applying
federal law to determine who is the proper plaintiff to sue in an ATS case alleging death
in violation of international law where the application of state law would have precluded
recovery by the decedent’s sister).
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Indeed, the application of state law to an interstitial question of federal
law does not undermine the effectiveness of a federal remedial scheme
simply because the state law permits recovery for only certain classes of
plaintiffs. In Robertson v. Wegmann, the Supreme Court addressed whether
a state survival statute was “inconsistent” with federal law where the
statute dictated that only certain of the decedent’s surviving relatives could
maintain the underlying § 1983 action on behalf of the deceased.245 In
that case, the original plaintiff in the lawsuit died before his case went to
trial, and the executor of his estate was subsequently substituted as
the plaintiff.246 On appeal, the petitioners argued that the case should
be dismissed because state survivorship law applied to the question of
survival of claims, and under this law, the executor was not among the
class of individuals authorized to maintain a survival action.247 The
Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners, reasoning that although the
application of state law in this case would bar the plaintiff’s suit, the state
law in question was not “inhospitable” to survivorship claims in general
because it permitted the survival of claims in the majority of cases.248 As
the Court explained, “A state statute cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’
with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the
litigation.”249
Robertson’s reasoning is equally applicable to the situation where the
application of state law would permit only a certain class of relatives to
bring wrongful death claims under Sosa. As the Supreme Court held,
Congress understood the common law claim identified in Sosa as
providing a meaningful remedy to aliens for violations of international
law.250 As in Robertson, this remedial purpose is not undermined simply
because one class of plaintiffs is barred from recovery.251 So long as the
applicable state law is not generally “inhospitable” to wrongful death
claims—the state law does not bar wrongful death claims altogether or
otherwise restrict wrongful death actions in an “unreasonable” manner—

245. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 586–87 (1978).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 587.
248. Id. at 594.
249. Id. at 593; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006) (allowing courts to look to “the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein” when federal-jurisdiction-granting statutes
are insufficient “to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law”).
250. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004) (observing that
the ATS was most likely meant to address “concern over the inadequate vindication of
the law of nations”); see also Casto, supra note 78, at 499–500 (explaining that the
historical record indicates the ATS was meant to be a “broad, sweeping provision” addressing
“all foreseeable and unforeseeable violations by individuals of the law of nations”).
251. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593.
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state law should still govern the question of proper plaintiff.252 Thus, as
in the case of § 1983 actions, the applicability of state law should not
turn “solely on which side is advantaged thereby.”253 This is so because
“[i]f success of the [action] were the only benchmark, there would be no
reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then always
be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially
irrelevant.”254
Accordingly, in the vast majority of cases, forum state law should
determine the identity of the proper plaintiff in Sosa actions seeking
recovery for the death of an individual caused by a violation of
international law.
3. Survival Claims Under Sosa
The survivorship of Sosa claims presents a related yet distinct question
from whether to recognize a common law cause of action for death in
violation of international law. Survivorship rules determine whether an
existing claim survives the death of the injured party as an asset of the
party’s estate, whereas wrongful death rules establish a new cause of
action, accruing to specified beneficiaries, for damages arising from
the injured party’s death.255 As Speiser and Rooks describe, “Although
originating in the same wrongful act or neglect, the cause of action which
survives . . . is for the wrong to the injured person, while the wrongful
death action . . . is for the wrong to the beneficiaries.”256 Because of these
theoretical differences, the relevant inquiry with respect to the survivorship
of Sosa claims is not whether courts should recognize a new cause of
action upon the injured party’s death but rather whether governing law
provides for the survival, or continuation, of the party’s existing claim
after the party’s death.257

252. Id. at 591–94.
253. Id. at 593.
254. Id.
255. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 294.
256. 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:13.
257. Cf. Estate of Masselli ex rel. Masselli v. Silverman, 606 F. Supp. 341, 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that in a case alleging injuries to a deceased victim of federal
civil rights violations, the “right of action belongs to the [decedent],” and thus, the viability of
his claims does not turn on whether the plaintiff in the lawsuit has a cause of action for
the decedent’s death but rather whether the decedent’s claims themselves survive his death
under federal law).
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The survivorship rules governing a federal claim are a matter of federal
law, or more specifically here, federal common law.258 As described above,
federal common law normally incorporates state law as the substantive
rules of decision in a given case.259 However, a court may set aside state
law and instead craft uniform federal rules where there is a distinct need
for national uniformity, where related federal legislation evidences
congressional policy choices on an analogous point of law, or where the
application of a particular state law would frustrate important federal
interests.260
With respect to the survivorship of Sosa claims, federal courts should
adopt a uniform federal rule drawn from the limited guidance on this
issue offered by Congress in the TVPA. As described above, the TVPA
represents the principal legislative statement on the scope of domestic
remedies for international law torts since the ATS.261 Therefore, to the
extent the statute speaks to the issue of survivorship of claims, these
provisions reflect the balance struck by Congress between the interests
of providing adequate remedies for these international law violations and
limiting these actions to certain classes of claimants.262
In that regard, the TVPA prescribes a bifurcated rule of survival for
claims of torture and extrajudicial killing. With respect to torture claims,
258. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1952 (3d ed. 2007) (“In a federal-question case,
federal law and federal decisions, rather than state law, determine whether the
action survives the death of a party . . . .” (citing Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80
(1884))); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (“Bivens actions are a creation of
federal law and, therefore, the question whether respondent’s action survived [the
decedent’s] death is a question of federal law.”).
259. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text; see also Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (2004) (observing that the TVPA offers the legislature’s
rejoinder to the federal courts’ assumption of common law power with the Filartiga line
of cases).
262. Cf. DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983)
(holding that section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act was “designed to
accommodate a balance of interests very similar” to those at stake in determining the
statute of limitations on claims for wrongful termination and unfair representation). In
the recent case Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (2010), the Ninth Circuit held
that the DOHSA governed the survivorship of Sosa claims arising out of alleged
international law violations occurring off the coast of Nigeria. Id. at 1125–26 (“DOHSA
preempts all survival claims for deaths on the high seas unless there is clear indication
that Congress intended otherwise.”). The court’s ruling, however, necessarily turned on
the fact that the Sosa claims at issue alleged international law violations occurring on the
“high seas.” See id. Therefore, assuming Bowoto’s reasoning is accurate, DOHSA would
still not prescribe the survivorship rule for other types of Sosa claims. Rather, as described
above, the TVPA represents Congress’s most relevant statement on the applicable
survivorship rule.
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only the torture victim may bring suit against the alleged torturer.263 There
is no provision for the survival of torture claims beyond the victim’s
death.264 By contrast, in the case of extrajudicial killing, the statute permits
the victim’s “legal representative” to bring suit for damages on behalf of
the decedent.265 Thus, under the TVPA, claims of torture abate upon the
victim’s death, while claims of extrajudicial killing survive and may be
pursued by the victim’s “legal representative.” In accordance with this
framework, Sosa claims should be subject to a similar survivorship rule
providing that claims based on fatal injury, like extrajudicial killing,
survive to the decedents’ estate, while claims based on nonfatal injury,
like torture, abate upon the victim’s death.
This bifurcated survivorship rule is consistent with the Court’s reasoning
in the analogous setting of Bivens litigation. In Carlson v. Green,
discussed previously, the Supreme Court held that a Bivens claim based
on a constitutional deprivation causing fatal injury survives the death of
the alleged victim.266 In that regard, the Court concluded that “whenever
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought
against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common
law allows survival of that action.”267 The Court stressed that its holding
turned on the “essentiality of the survival of civil rights claims for
complete vindication of constitutional rights” in cases alleging fatal
injury.268 To rule otherwise, the Court pronounced, would “frustrate in
[an] important way the achievement of the goals of Bivens actions.”269
In fashioning this common law rule of survivorship, Carlson
distinguished an earlier precedent set by Robertson v. Wegmann, also
discussed above, wherein the Supreme Court held that a constitutional
tort claim under § 1983 would abate in accordance with the law of the
263. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(1)).
264. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that
the TVPA “is conspicuously silent on the question of whether a third party may bring
suit on behalf of a tortured relative”).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)); see also
Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347, 1348 n.11 (11th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the TVPA permits the recovery of damages suffered by the deceased victim of
an extrajudicial killing).
266. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23–25 (1980).
267. Id. at 24 (quoting Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d,
446 U.S. 14 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id. (quoting Green, 581 F.2d at 674) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Id. at 25 (alteration in original) (quoting UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 702 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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forum state.270 The Court reasoned that Robertson was inapposite
because the plaintiff’s death in that case “was not caused by the acts of
the defendants upon which the suit was based.”271 As a result, there was
little concern that allowing the plaintiff’s claim to abate would undermine
the remedial policies underlying the federal civil rights statutes.272 By
contrast, in Carlson, the alleged illegal conduct did in fact cause the
plaintiff’s death, increasing the risk that potential tortfeasors could take
advantage of disparate state survivorship rules to avoid liability.273
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that where the illegality alleged causes
the plaintiff’s death, only a uniform federal rule of survivorship is
“compatible” with the goal of providing adequate vindication of
constitutional rights.274
The survivorship rule for Sosa claims suggested above comports with
this reasoning. As in Carlson, the proposed rule acknowledges that the
survival of a Sosa claim based on fatal injury is essential to the vindication
of the remedial policies animating these common law actions.275 The
Supreme Court understood the common law remedy identified in Sosa as
providing a vehicle for the vindication of widely accepted and clearly
defined international law norms in federal court.276 This policy would
be subverted without a rule allowing for the survival of claims alleging
international law torts causing fatal injury. The reasoning of the lower
court in Carlson, which the Supreme Court ultimately adopted, is on
point: “Allowing recovery for injury but denying relief for the ultimate
injury—death—would mean that it would be more advantageous for a
270. See id. at 24–25 (distinguishing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978)).
271. Id. at 24. Moreover, the Court noted that the claims at issue in Robertson—
federal civil rights claims against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—are statutorily
obligated to incorporate forum state law where federal law is silent on a matter of
remedial procedure, so long as the state law is not “inconsistent” with federal law. Id. at
24 n.11 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)). The Court noted that Bivens claims are not
subject to the same statutory incorporation requirement and “cogent reasons” argued
against the application of state law to the particular survival question presented in Carlson,
namely, the survivorship of a federal constitutional tort claim based on fatal injury. See
id.
272. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 (holding that “in situations in which there is
no claim that the illegality caused the plaintiff’s death,” the application of a state survival
rule that would abate the plaintiff’s claim “surely would not adversely affect § 1983’s
role in preventing official illegality”).
273. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24, 25 & n.12 (holding that application of state
survivorship law to Bivens claims where the alleged illegality caused the victim’s death
would undermine the remedial purpose of Bivens actions because “an official could
know at the time he decided to act whether his intended victim’s claim would survive”).
274. Id. at 23.
275. Id. (“[O]nly a uniform federal rule of survivorship will suffice to redress the
constitutional deprivation here alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct.”).
276. See supra notes 25–44 and accompanying text.
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tortfeasor to kill rather than to injure. Surely this cannot be the intent of
the law.”277 In line with this reasoning, the proposed survivorship rule
permits the survival of Sosa claims based on fatal injury.
The same cannot be said, however, about Sosa claims based on nonfatal
injury. As Carlson acknowledged, different considerations apply where
the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the illegal conduct alleged.278
Indeed, Carlson expressly limited its survivorship holding to Bivens
claims based on fatal injury, while distinguishing the rationale in its
previous precedent Robertson as applying to claims based on nonfatal
injury.279 In that regard, Robertson stands for the proposition that where
the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the illegality alleged, a rule
permitting claim survival is unnecessary to secure the benefits of a given
remedial scheme.280 A similar judgment is evidenced by the TVPA in
the context of a nonfatal violation of international law.281 Although a
different policy choice may be valid, the judicial deference outlined in
Sosa commands that the common law rules applicable to Sosa claims
adhere as closely as possible to Congress’s expressed judgment.282
Thus, in accordance with this congressional intent, the proposed
survivorship rule would abate Sosa claims based on nonfatal injury upon
the victim’s death.
Based on this reasoning, courts should adopt a survivorship rule for
Sosa claims providing that those claims based on nonfatal injury abate
upon the victim’s death, while those based on fatal injury survive to the
decedent’s estate.
4. Identity of the Survival Claimant
The TVPA also points to the appropriate rules of decision for
determining who is the proper plaintiff in a survival suit under Sosa.
The TVPA provides that in the case of an extrajudicial killing, a victim’s
“legal representative” may bring suit for damages on behalf of the
277. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
278. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24–25 (observing that the abatement of a federal civil
rights claim would not undermine the remedial purpose of federal civil rights law where
“the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the acts of the defendants upon which the suit
was based”).
279. See id.
280. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592–93 (1978).
281. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action).
282. See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
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deceased.283 Although the statute itself does not define “legal
representative,” the discernible congressional intent indicates that this
term should be applied in accordance with state law.284
The survivorship rule for Sosa claims should similarly rely on state
law to determine who may bring a survival suit. As with the statute’s
main survivorship rule, the TVPA’s claimant provisions express Congress’s
considered judgment on the issue of who precisely may bring suit on
behalf of a deceased victim of international rights abuses. Moreover,
this direction to incorporate state law as the applicable rule of decision
comports with the general practice of adopting forum state rules to fill
the interstices in federal remedial schemes.285 Thus, in accordance with
the congressional intent expressed in the TVPA, the proper plaintiff in a
survival suit under Sosa should be determined by reference to forum
state law.
***
In sum, under the wrongful death-survivorship approach proposed
here, state law primarily governs the question of whether the surviving
relatives of a deceased victim of international law violations can bring
suit in ATS cases based on harm to the decedent. The putative plaintiffs’
authority to bring suit would be framed not as a statutory standing
question but rather as a merits inquiry into the availability of wrongful
death or survival damages. With respect to those claims pressing wrongful
death damages, federal common law supplies the cause of action, while
forum state law—incorporated as federal law—would provide the rules
of decision determining the plaintiffs’ eligibility to bring suit. As for
those claims seeking survival damages, federal common law, as guided
by the TVPA, would allow for the survival of only those Sosa claims
based on fatal injury. Moreover, state survivorship law—also incorporated
as federal law—would govern the question of who precisely could bring
suit in the resulting survivorship action.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Approach
The proposed wrongful death-survival framework improves upon the
prevailing Xuncax approach in a number of ways. First, this new approach
abandons Xuncax’s conceptually flawed standing formulation in favor of

283.
284.
285.
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28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)).
See supra note 241.
See supra note 213.
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a cause of action analysis more in line with governing precedent.286 By
framing the deceased-victim issue as a pure merits determination, the
proposed analysis focuses attention on the true nature of the inquiry, that
is, whether to recognize a wrongful death cause of action and rule of
survivorship. Indeed, with respect to those Sosa claims seeking wrongful
death damages, the prevailing standing formulation assumes without
analysis that a cause of action already exists for death in violation of
international law and that the only question remaining is whether the
particular plaintiffs are authorized to assert that action as a matter of
law.287 In truth, however, by borrowing “standing” requirements from
the TVPA, the court created a new cause of action—a new federal
remedy—without confronting the various limitations attendant to that
exercise of judicial power.288
A similar obfuscation occurs with respect to Sosa claims seeking
survival damages. Again, the Xuncax approach focuses exclusively on the
plaintiff’s ability to raise the decedent’s claim in a representative capacity.
In so doing, however, this analysis ignores the preliminary question of
whether the claim at issue survives the decedent’s death in the first place.
Basic principles of tort law, however, dictate that a person’s claim abates
upon that person’s death absent explicit injunction to the contrary.289
Xuncax fails to come to terms with this rule and skips immediately to the
issue of the proper plaintiff to bring suit on behalf of the decedent. The
proposed approach, by contrast, forces courts to confront this issue
squarely, thereby producing clearer doctrine more aligned with precedent.290
In addition to these conceptual improvements, the proposed framework
also provides the federal courts with clearer guidance on the resolution
of the deceased-victim issue. As described above, even accepting the
Xuncax framework’s standing formulation, the federal courts continued
to express uncertainty regarding the proper application of the framework’s

286. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 (D. Mass. 1995).
287. Id. at 189–92.
288. See supra notes 140–77 and accompanying text.
289. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 87, § 51; see also Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 212, 224 (1854) (“[T]his action did not survive the death of the defendant, but
abated upon the occurrence of that event . . . .”).
290. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 3531.6 (noting that “[a]s to private
disputes, it would be good to displace standing by direct inquiry into the existence of a claim
for an available remedy” because a cause of action analysis “is more likely to yield cogent
results” than complex standing tests in the majority of cases).
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analysis, particularly its choice of law rule.291 The proposed approach
reduces this uncertainty by grounding its analysis in longstanding principles
of federal common law.292 Whereas under Xuncax, courts must utilize
the ambiguous standard of whether the application of a given state law
leaves a decedent’s relatives with “no remedy whatsoever,” the proposed
approach directs courts to principles of federal common law for the
appropriate rules of decision, a rubric that points to well-developed state
law on wrongful death and survivorship.293 By offering courts a defined
body of legal principles from which to draw decisional rules, the proposed
approach promotes greater consistency in the resolution of international
law tort cases brought in federal court.
A potential objection to this proposed framework argues that reliance
on state law rules of decision would in fact engender greater uncertainty
in the litigation of the proper plaintiff issue. However, any “uncertainty”
generated is simply the predictable consequence of our federal system,
and as discussed, concerns over national uniformity do not justify
displacement of generally applicable state law rules.294 Moreover, whatever
“uncertainty” may result from adoption of the proposed approach would
be less than the uncertainty attendant to the Xuncax formulation. Indeed,
as discussed above, Xuncax essentially leaves courts to apply some
unspecified choice of law analysis that could potentially lead to the
application of foreign state law.295 By contrast, the proposed approach
points to well-settled federal common law rubrics and defined state rules
on wrongful death and survival. Even granting that some state law may
too point to foreign law for the applicable rule of decision, at least under
the proposed approach, that choice of law analysis will be spelled out in
the relevant state jurisprudence.
Critics of the proposed framework may also parrot Xuncax’s argument
that state law is simply “ill-tailored for cases grounded on violations of the
law of nations.”296 This position rests on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the wrongful death-survivorship framework. Under the proposed

291. See supra notes 106–28.
292. Accord Casto, supra note 47, at 644–45 (observing that given that ATS litigation is
“so obviously analogous to Bivens litigation,” courts should “draw upon all the usual
resources of the common law to fashion appropriate rules of decision”).
293. Accord Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 460–62, 501 (2007) (arguing that
in the vast majority of cases, federal common law rules developed under Sosa should adopt
state law as the applicable rules of decision because state law constitutes “an understandable,
well-defined, democratically sufficient body of law” on which federal courts can rely).
294. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text.
296. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D. Mass. 1995).
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approach, the law applied is federal law—federal common law, to be
precise. State law rules of decision become relevant only to the extent
they are incorporated as federal common law. More to the point, as
described above, even if state law is not accustomed to dealing with the
magnitude of present-day human rights violations, municipal regulations
are certainly familiar with issues pertaining to recovery for death and
personal injury, precisely the decisional rules relevant to the deceasedvictim issue.297
V. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a solution to an increasingly common question
in ATS litigation: Who is the proper plaintiff in suits where the actual
victim of the international law violations alleged is deceased? Contrary
to prevailing jurisprudence, I contend that courts should view this
question not as an issue of plaintiff standing but as a cause of action
inquiry rooted in wrongful death and survivorship law. By reframing the
question in these terms, the proposed approach allows courts to focus on
what is actually at stake in these deceased-victim cases: whether an
individual who is the not the victim of the international law violation
alleged may nonetheless seek a remedy for the illegal conduct at issue.
Moreover, the proposed analysis avoids the unnecessary confusion wrought
by the prevailing standing formulation and also ameliorates the uncertainty
surrounding what body of law supplies the rules of decision on this issue.
The resulting doctrine will be more consistent with governing precedent
and easier for courts to apply in practice.
Beyond these tangible advantages, the proposed framework also serves as
a model for deciphering other issues in ATS litigation unrelated to the
defendant’s liability. Sosa established that the standards and scope of
liability in any ATS case are drawn principally from international law.
Yet once the standards of liability are in place, a host of other questions
arise that are just as important to the resolution of a particular case. What, if
any, nonstatutory immunities can a defendant assert? Must plaintiffs
exhaust domestic remedies before filing suit?298 What is the proper measure

297. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(imposing a prudential exhaustion requirement on ATS actions).
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of damages?299 This Article suggests that the answers to these and related
questions can be determined through the application of established
principles of federal common law decisionmaking. In that regard, judges
hearing ATS disputes should be mindful of precedents in similar contexts
where courts have crafted common law remedies for violations of legally
enforceable rights.

299. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (crafting
federal common law rules to determine the amount of damages in an ATS action brought
against Zimbabwean government officials).
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